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ABSTRACT 
The on-going significance of the rural areas in policy formation in South Africa has its roots 
in the country's spatially skewed population distribution and the persistence of 'oscillating' 
or 'circular' migration. Thus, rural income (its level, sources and distribution) and rural 
welfare remain important policy considerations. This thesis, based on a microeconomic study 
of three Ciskeian villages, examines these issues, and attempts to use the understanding so 
gained, to consider the likelihood of continued circular migration. 
Chapter 1 places the study in context, providing necessary background to the research area. 
Chapter 2 looks at the spatial structure and education levels of households in the three 
villages studied. Chapter 3 deals with the problem of defining and measuring 'rural 
household income', whilst Chapter 4 examines the adequacy and distribution of this income, 
paying attention to how changes in various components of income affect rural income 
distribution and welfare. This thesis is concluded in Chapter 5 with an analysis of the factors 
contributing to the persistence of circular migration. 
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South Africa is currently faced with the sensitive problem of formulating a future regional 
policy that on the one hand, recognises (and does not repeat) the political and economic 
failures of past regional policy (of which the homelands can be considered part) and, on the 
other hand, takes cognisance of the demographic realities that are the legacy of such policy. 
Over the last seven years, South Africa has experienced rapid urbanisation. The Standard 
Bank (1992), combining official figures with Development Bank of Southern Africa and 
Urban Foundation measures, suggest that the urban proportion of South Africa's Black 
population has risen from 46 per cent in 1985 to 51 per cent in 1992. However, Mabin 
(1990: 311) points out that a considerable proportion of this urban population growth has 
been generated from natural increase in the urban population rather than high rural-urban 
permanent migration. 
Despite this trend, South Africa and other countries in the developing world, have exhibited 
slower rates of urbanisation than the countries that today constitute the developed world and 
those predicted by orthodox models of urban transition. 
Not only do the orthodox models (such as the Todaro model: Todaro, 1969) 
predict an urban transition which seems reluctant to occur in most of the third 
world countries, but they do not deal with considerable migration within rural 
areas, nor with patterns such as large-scale (return) migration from urban to 
rural areas even when large differentials exist in favour of urban areas 
(Mabin, 1990: 311-312). 
. 
Mabin suggests that South Africa's observed departure from traditional wisdom stems from 
the fact that circular (temporary) migration appears to be an enduring phenomenon in the 
South African labour market. Such oscillating migration does not seem to have given way 
to permanent rural-urban migration to the extent predicted by orthodox models. In this 
regard, South Africa is not unlike other developing countries. 
Indeed, in many parts of the world circular migration continues without any 
state policy to foster it and without noticeable large institutions (such as those 
of the gold mine labour system) to sustain it (Mabin, 1990: 313)1• 
2 
As Mabin goes on to note, South African authors, particularly from the 'radical' school, have 
tended to over-emphasise the role of Apanheid and preceding state policy in explaining South 
Africa's retarded urbanisation. Hindson (1987) argues that South African labour market 
history is comprised of a succession of systematic attempts by government to control the 
spatial distribution of labour (for example, hut taxes, separate development, pass laws and 
influx control). Hindson' s central point is that Apanheid laws ( on top of earlier labour 
market legislation) left South Africa with a differentiated labour supply consisting of: 
(a) a small, Black permanent urban workforce with their permanent residency in the 
urban areas based on their birthplace, continued residency and continued employment 
in the urban areas, and 
(b) a large, Black urban workforce consisting of temporary migrants with close family, 
economic and residential ties with the rural base. 
However, Mabin (1990: 313) argues that such 'institutional' analysis of temporary migration 
is simplistic, having led to the apparent misconception that South Africa's urbanisation 
experience is unique in world terms and that II conformity with the urban transition model II 
would be an inevitable concomitant of the removal of discriminatory legislation such as pass 
laws. As has been seen, despite the removal of influx control, temporary migration persists. 
Thus, there exists a need for a new urban transition model that incorporates the reality of 
long term temporary migration and goes beyond the analysis of institutions impacting on the 
labour market. In line with recent trends in development economics, Mabin suggests that 
such a model must take into account the very household behaviour of which the decision to 
migrate on a temporary basis is a part2• In other words, temporary rural-urban migration 
cannot be viewed in isolation. Attention has to be paid to the constraints under which the 
1 Mabin recognises that the possibility of long term temporary migration in the absence of institutional 
intervention is not a new idea, having being noted twenty years ago by Bell (1972: 355). 
2See the Household Decision Models of Becker (1965 and 1988), Low (1986) and Singh, Squire and Strauss 
(1986). 
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rural household operates, the distributional impact of temporary migration on rural areas and 
the availability of both urban and rural jobs. 
This thesis attempts to look at these issues by analysing the household income levels and 
migration behaviour in three villages in the Ciskei. The focus of the analysis is on the causes 
and sources of inter-village differences in household income, and the understanding so gained 
is used to consider the factors contributing to _the persistence of temporary migration. 
An attempt is made to dispel the notion that rural families are peripheral agricultural units 
that respond, in a uniform way, to institutional intervention. Rural households are by no 
means homogeneous in their characteristics or aspirations. Within a single village significant 
disparities in income levels and sources of income are found. These disparities directly affect 
the economic focus of household activities and the way in which households respond to 
institutional intervention and price signals in both the rural and urban markets. 
In the course of this analysis, the problem of defining and measuring rural household 
income is addressed. This constitutes an important theoretical issue given the diverse sources 
of rural income and the significance of in-kind income. Attention is also given to the 
adequacy of rural household incomes and the contribution of different components of 
household income to overall village income inequality. Given the fact that approximately 
half of South Africa's Black population remains in the rural areas (Standard Bank, 1992), 
sources of rural income inequality remain an important topic for policy-makers. 
1.1. Details of the Study 
The data on which this thesis is based are drawn from a 1990 household survey of three 
villages in the Keiskammahoek magisterial district of the Ciskei. The survey, conducted by 
the author, formed part of the 1990 Keiskammahoek Rural Survey which was run under the 
auspices of the Institute of Social and Economic Research at Rhodes University, 
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Grahamstown, as a follow up to the Keiskammahoek Rural Survey of 194g3. A copy of the 
household questionnaire used is provided in Appendix A 4• 
The three villages studied, Upper Rabula5, Burnshi116 and Chatha (see map in Appendix B), 
were selected for a number of reasons: 
(1) Mills and Wilson (1952) and Houghton and Walton (1952) covered all three of these 
villages (amongst others) in the 1949 Keiskammahoek Rural Survey and thus there 
exists valuable historical data against which comparisons can be drawn. Indeed, the 
year of the original survey, 1949, provides an important starting point for historical 
comparisons as it is the year following the start of National Party rule in South 
Africa, and thus enables an analysis of the impact of forty years of Apartheid rule on 
the area; 
(2) The villages have different geographic positions relative to the local urban centres, 
giving each a different degree of access to local urban economies; and 
(3) Within the three villages, a rich diversity of land tenure is found (De Wet, 1991), the 
three main types being: 
(a) 'Trust tenure', which is the situation where land is owned communally and 
plots are allocated to specific households by the village 'headman' or, as at the 
3The original survey is written up in Houghton and Walton, 1952; Mills and Wilson, 1952; Mountain, 1952; 
and Wilson, Kaplan, Maki and Walton, 1952. 
4Copies of the completed questionnaires, along with the rest of the raw data from both the 1949 and 1990 
surveys are housed in the Cory Library at Rhodes University, Grahamstown. 
5For the purposes of simplicity, 'Upper Rabula' will hereinafter simply be referred to as 'Rabula'. 
6The village of Bumshill has been defined as all households falling under the Burnshill Residents' 
Association in 1990. This differs from the definition of Bumshill used by Houghton and Walton (1952) and 
Manona (1981) in prior studies of the area. They included in their Burnshill sample households that today fall 
under the separate villages Ngxondoreni and Lenye that, having their own schools, residents' associations and 
clinics, were not considered part of Bumshill for the purposes of this study. 
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time of the survey, the village residents' committee. Such title is not 'strong' 
in the sense that it cannot be transferred by either sale or inheritance; 
(b) 'Freehold title', which is the ownership of land in the traditional 'modern 
sector' sense. Freehold land can be transferred to another owner by either 
sale or inheritance (either in terms of a will, South African common law or 
failing this, African customary law); and 
(c) 'Quitrent tenure', which is akin to an extremely long lease on a piece of 
land, the lease payments being a inordinately low fixed sum. Such title, like 
freehold title, can be transferred through sale or inheritance. 
Rabula includes examples of both freehold and trust land tenure, as well as landless 
families and families that squat on either freehold land or the commonage. The 
Burnshill sample is split between families that have quitrent land and landless families 
that have either been allocated residential sites, or squat, on the commonage. Chatha 
exhibits communal land tenure, although there are landless families in Chatha that do 
not have allocated arable plots. A more detailed discussion of land tenure 
arrangements in the three villages is presented in Appendix C. 
The empirical study was conducted between October 1990 and February 1991 and consisted 
of detailed interviews with ninety-eight households taken from the three villages. The sample 
is a 1 in 10 random sample of occupied homesteads in the three villages. Thirty-eight 
households were interviewed in Rabula, 22 in Burnshill and 38 in Chatha. The survey 
covered a total of 776 persons (349, 173, and 254 in Rabula, Burnshill and Chatha 
respectively). 
1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 provides background data that places the subsequent analysis of rural household 
incomes in context. Various 'demographic' aspects of the rural households are considered, 
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including the spatial structure and education levels of households. Rural employment rates 
and dependency ratios are also noted. 
The third chapter focuses on rural household income. The chapter looks at the problems of 
measuring rural income and, based on a tight theoretical definition of income, sets out the 
methodology used to circumvent these problems. The relative importance of different 
sources of income is discussed, with particular reference to household agricultural and 
migration behaviour. 
Chapter 4 is focused on an assessment of living standards and income inequality in the three 
villages. An 'absolute' measure of poverty, based on individual poverty datum lines 
calculated for each household sampled, is given. Furthermore, this chapter presents a 
theoretical technique (outlined by Shorrocks, 1983 and Stark, Yitzhaki and Taylor, 1986) that 
is used to isolate the contribution of different components of household income to overall 
income inequality. This inequality decomposition analysis concentrates on the distributional 
and welfare effects of remittances from migrant labour and a number of policy implications 
are noted. 
Based on the results derived in Chapters 3 and 4, Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation with 
a discussion of the factors that are apparently propagating the system of temporary migration 
that currently characterises the urban transition. It is shown how a number of rational 
household decisions and institutional factors all currently contribute to the persistence of 




HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPmc PROFILE 
2.1. Household Size 
Adopting the view of Becker (1965 and 1988), households can be viewed as rational 
economic units maximising utility subject to a time and income constraint. Household 
structure is therefore an important 'economic variable' that responds to changing economic 
signals over time. 
Changes in household size and structure over time provide important insights into the 
household's changing economic environment. However, at the outset, it is necessary to 
accurately define the term 'rural household', paying attention to exactly who is, and who is 
not, a member of the rural household. 
For the purposes of this study, the household is taken to be a spatially diverse entity, 
encompassing a 'rural base' with urban links. A person away from the rural base is 
considered a member of the household if that person has remitted to, or visited the 
household within the year prior to the survey. 
However, as in any empirical study, such rigid definitions cannot always be realistically 
applied. In a few specific cases, persons who did not fulfil the strict definition above were 
taken to be family members (for example, a mineworker who visits the rural base once every 
eighteen months). In practice the households have very clear views on who their household 
members are, and careful attention had to be given to their explanations even when they 
contradicted the guidelines set out above. 
Details of household structure are given in Table 1: 
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Average Average 
Average Number Number 
Household Living at Away 
Size Home from Home 
Rabula: Freehold (17 households) 9.18 6.47 (70%) 2.71 (30%) 
Rabula: Other7 (21 households) 9.19 6.62 (72%) 2.57 (28%) 
RABULA: Total (38 households) 9.18 6.55 (71 %) 2.63 (29%) 
Bumshill: Quitrent8 (11 households) 8.82 7.00 (79%) 1.82 (21 %) 
Bumshill: Other (11 households) 6.91 5.09 (74%) 1.82 (26%) 
BURNSHILL: Total (22 households) 7.86 6.05 (77%) 1.82 (23%) 
I CHATHA9: Total (38 households) I 6.68 4.66 (70%) 2.03 (30%) I ACROSS ALL THREE VILLAGES I 7.92 5.70 (72%) 2.21 (28%) 
Table 1: Household Structure 
It can be seen that in Rabula the average total household size is 9.18 persons, compared with 
7.86 in Bumshill and 6.68 in Chatha. The exact explanation of the differences in household 
size between the areas is by no means clear. Education, degree of integration with local and 
urban economies and income levels appear to be important factors in this regard. These 
themes will be taken up in subsequent analysis dealing with income differences between the 
different villages. 
Land tenure appears to be merely an 'historical' factor in determining household size in the 
sense that it influences, and has influenced, factors such as education levels and families' 
degree of integration with the regional economy. In many instances, especially in the case 
of freehold tenure in Rabula and quitrent tenure in Bumshill, a family's firm title to land is 
directly correlated with a family's degree of permanence and influence within a village. 
Thus, if one categorises families by land tenure type, one is inevitably classifying households 
7This category includes landless families and families with access to trust land. 
8This includes one freehold family in Bumshill. 
9In Chatha all families either have access to trust land, or are landless. In this regard, they are similar to 
households falling under the 'other' category in Rabula. 
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on the basis of a host of extraneous socio-economic factors not directly related to the 
productivity of different types of land usage. 
If household size is analyzed according to land tenure form (see Table 1), a number of 
observations can be made: 
(1) Families in the Rabula sample appear to be of similar size regardless of land tenure 
form. This finding is contrary to the evidence of De Wet, Manona and Palmer 
(1992: 35) and Mills and Wilson (1952: 122) that land-owning families are larger 
than their non-title-holding counterparts. However, since this particular survey 
focuses on aspects of inter-village income differences, it can only shed light, rather 
than conclusively prove (or disprove) intra-village differences based on land tenure. 
(2) Non-freehold Rabula households appear to be increasing in average size. The 1990 
figure of 9.19 persons is notably higher than 6.87 in 1986 (De Wet et al., 1992: 35), 
adding weight to the contention of De Wet et al. (1992: 36) that households in Rabula 
are getting larger. Indeed, if one of the direct determinants of household size is 
education (and the 'land tenure effect' on household size is indirect and 'historical'), 
average household size of freeholders and non-landowners within the same village 
would be expected to converge over time as education levels converge. 
(3) Different trends in household structure and size since 1949 can be identified for the 
different types of land tenure. In a 1949 survey across four Keiskammahoek 
villages10, Mills and Wilson (1952: 125) found that freehold families (predominantly 
taken from Rabula) had an average size of9.14 persons in 1949, with 6.62 persons 
at home and 2.52 persons away. This structure is practically identical to that found 
in freehold families in Rabula in this survey. 
The average size of quitrent families (almost exclusively taken from Bumshill in the 
1949 survey) has grown from 7.70persons in 1949 (5.57 at home and 2.13 away) to 
. to Rabula (Upper and Lower), Burnsbill, Chatha and Mthwaku. 
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8.82 (7.00 at home and 1.82 away) today. This growth in size would appear to be 
largely due to the fact that the number of quitrent sites in Burnshill has remained 
unchanged since 1949 and in the intervening years it has been difficult for the 
offspring of quitrenters to obtain new Burnshill residential sites due to local political 
sensitivity surrounding the allocation of such sites. 
It can also be seen that a notably higher proportion of quitrent families lived away 
from the rural base in 1949 than do today (28 per cent in 1949 compared to 21 per 
cent in 1990) (Mills and Wilson, 1952: 125). This appears to be a result of Burnshill 
families' increasing ability to find jobs in the local economy. 
Possibly the most notable change in household size since 1949 can be found amongst 
families with communal and trust tenure. According to Mills and Wilson (1952: 125) 
such families (based on data taken largely from Chatha) averaged 6.25 persons in 
1949 (5.44 at home and 0.81 away), compared to the average of 6.68 persons (4.66 
at home and 2.03 away) found in Chatha today. The vast increase in the number of 
people away from home (13 per cent in 1949 compared to 30 per cent in 1990) 
appears due to two factors: 
the general rise in education levels in Chatha since 1949 has necessarily been 
accompanied by people living away from home for the purpose of study as 
Chatha has not had a high school that can compete with some of the schools 
in surrounding villages (for example, in 1990 ,Chatha High School did not, 
as yet, offer matric); and 
the absentee rate in 1949 was particularly low because many Chatha residents 
were able to find jobs in the local forestry department on a forestry 
development programme that was being undertaken at the time of the survey. 
These jobs have long since ceased to exist. 
(4) In Burnshill, families with firm quitrent title to land tend to be larger than those on 
the commonage. This is explained by the length of time the households have been 
established in the area. The quitrent households have been firmly established since 
the late 1930's and consequently often extend back a generation further than the 'less 
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established' households on the commonage. Indeed, many of the families on the 
commonage are the families of the younger married children of quitrenters and thus, 
one would expect them to be smaller. 
(5) In both Chatha and Rabula approximately 30 per cent of the population is away from 
the rural base (Table 1). In Bumshill, a slightly lower proportion of the sample is . 
away, especially amongst the quitrenters. As has already been mentioned, residents 
of Bumshill appear to have been the most successful at integrating with the local and 
regional economy and are less reliant on earnings from distant urban centres. This 
finding is an important link in understanding inter-village differences and will be 
discussed in detail in subsequent chapters. 
2.2. Education 
The three villages have marked differences in education levels. Table 2 shows the average 
education levels of persons 18 years and older that are not currently full time scholars or 
students: 
Average 
Years of Standard 
Education Deviation 
Rabula 7.57 1.97 
Bum shill 9.36 2.04 
Chatha 6.82 1.84 
Table 2: Education Levels 
The figure of 7 .57 for Rabula is lower than that of 8.16 found in a 1986 survey of Rabula 
(De Wet et al., 1992: 31). This difference is explained by the inclusion in the 1986 figure 
of all people over 18 years regardless of whether they have finished their education or not. 
In this survey, by considering only those eighteen and older that have finished studying, one 
excludes quite a few persons in their late teens and early twenties who have achieved 
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relatively high levels of education but have not yet completed their studies. This exclusion 
is made for the purposes of investigating linkages between income and education and the 
level of education of people studying at the time of the survey is more likely to be a 
determinant of future, as opposed to current, income. 
As can be seen from Table 2, Burnshill is significantly better educated than Rabula and 
Chatha. Indeed, the data shows that, on average, people from Chatha do not as yet complete 
primary school (7 years of education). The differences in educational levels across the three 
villages appear to be related to the differing degrees of access to educational facilities. 
Burnshill residents, with superior educational facilities closer to the home than the residents 
of Rabula and Chatha, face significantly lower transaction costs in obtaining an education. 
Burnshill continues to benefit from its mission school heritage, and is widely regarded as an 
'educational centre' within the district. The Majisa High School in Burnshill, which is one 
of the few schools in the area to offer matric science and mathematics, attracts scholars from 
surrounding villages. These scholars pay to board with Burnshill families or rent 
accommodation within the village. As has been mentioned, the high school at Chatha does 
not, as yet, offer matric. Thus pupils have to travel considerable distances or stay in other 
villages or towns to complete high school. The high school in Rabula was only starting to 
offer matric at the time of the survey, thus one would expect education levels in Rabula to 
rise as the transaction costs of obtaining education fall accordingly. 
In all three villages, education levels appear to be rising. This is seen within each village 
by comparing education levels of the different generations within the villages, or by 
comparing the results of this survey with prior research in the area. De Wet et al. (1992: 
31) points out that in the 1981 study of Chatha, the average education level was 5.95 
years11 • The 1990 figure of 6.82 years {Table 2) represents a 15 per cent increase in the 
previous 10 years12• 
11This figure represents average education levels of all people over 18, regardless of whether they are still 
busy with their education or not. 
12Realistically, the increase is greater than 15 per cent when one takes into account the definitional 
difference between De Wet's and this survey's average education figures. 
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Despite recent strides in education levels in Chatha, there was virtually no evidence of 
tertiary education in this village. The lack of a high school that offers matric in the village, 
coupled with low income levels (see Table 9), still prevents people achieving post-school 
qualifications. This fact is demonstrated by the lower variance about the mean education 
level in Chatha than in the other two villages. Evidence of this emerges in Table 3 which 
shows the percentage of households with significantly high or low average educational levels. 
Percentage of Households with an Average 
Household Education Level: 
Greater than Between 10 Less than 
12 Years and 12 Years 6 Years 
Rabula - 13% 18% 
Bum shill 14% 32% 9% 
Chatha - 5% 26% 
Table 3: Households with Sienificantly Hieb 
or Low Educational Levels · 
Fourteen per cent of the households in the Bumshill sample have average education levels 
beyond matric (amongst persons over 18 years who have completed their studies). These 
superior education levels have opened up skilled and semi-skilled employment opportunities 
to the residents of Bumshill. This is a crucial factor in explaining the higher average income 
levels in Bumshill (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2). 
In Bumshill and Rabula, it was found that quitrent and freehold families have slightly higher 
mean education levels than the other families (9.74 years compared with 8.98 years in 
Bum shill and 7. 75 years compared with 7.44 years in Rabula). The same conclusion was 
reached by De Wet et al. (1992: 31). The fact that 'land-owning' families appear to be 
better educated than their landless and trust counterparts would seem to be due to their 
greater historical stability in the area. Evidence from Mills and Wilson (1952) suggests that 
at the time of the 1949 Keiskammahoek survey, land tenure form was a significant source 
of class division within villages. This class division was particularly evident in the 
achievement of education levels. Land-owners, who generally enjoyed higher education 
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levels, had greater access to jobs and consequently enjoyed higher income levels, than non-
land-owners. This helped land-owners to achieve higher levels of education for their children 
(thereby perpetuating the division). However, over the years such class differences appear 
to have been eroded and access to educational opportunities within villages has become more 
equal. 
2.3. Dependency and Employment 
As can be seen from Table 4, all three villages are characterised by high dependency ratios 
(defined as the ratio of pensioners, pre-school children and full time scholars and students, 
to the potentially economically active population). 
D Dependency Ratio (Amongst family members living at the rural base) 
Rabula 4.00 
Bum shill 3.76 
Chatha 3.35 
Table 4: Dependency Ratios 
These ratios tend to compare favourably with the dependency ratio of 4.00 for the Ciskei as 
a whole calculated by the Development Bank of Southern Africa (1989). This is particularly 
so when one considers that the definition of a dependency ratio used in Table 4 is a far more 
stringent one than used by the Development Bank (who define the dependency ratio as the 
number of people outside the 15 years to 64 years age group as a ratio of all those between 
15 and 64). Thus, the Development Bank, by counting full time scholars and students 
between the ages of 15 and 64 as economically active, tends to under-estimate 'true 
dependency' and thus it can be surmised that dependency in all three villages is notably lower 
than the Ciskei average. 
Whilst these dependency ratios capture the high percentage of very young and very old in 
the rural areas, they do not necessarily constitute meaningful measures of economic 
15 
dependence in rural villages. Often families are more dependent on the old and the infirm, 
who qualify for old-age and disability pensions respectively, than on the potentially 
economically active segment of the population. As will be seen in Chapter 3, this is 
particularly the case in Chatha where government old-age and disability pensions account for 
one third of total household income (see Table 10). 
As has been mentioned, residents of Burnshill have been more successful at integrating with. 
the local and regional economy than the residents of Rabula and Chatha. Evidence of this 
is Burnshill's lower proportion of household members living away from the rural base for 
purposes of work (Table 5)13 , and higher proportion of family members with paying jobs 




Percentage of Total Household Living 
Away from the Rural Base: 
Busy with 
Working Education Unemployed 
22% 2% 4% 
16% 5% 2% 
19% 7% 4% 
Table 5: Persons Livine A way From 





13 As will be shown in Chapter 3 (Table 14), a greater proportion of Bumshill residents that do live and 




Cash Income-earners Resident in the 
Rural Area as a Percentage of: 
Total Economically Rurally-based 
Active Population Economically 




Table 6: Cash Income-earners Livin& 
at the Rural Base 
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The success of Bumshill residents in obtaining paying occupations within daily commutable 
distance from the rural base seems to derive from the location of Bumshill and the 
'prosperity' of Bumshill itself14• 
Bumshill is favourably situated to benefit from the job opportunities provided by the 
Zanyokwe irrigation scheme, which has its headquarters at Bumshill. The scheme provides 
jobs in various forms (clerks, labourers, shop assistants etc.) for 38 per cent of the income-
earners living at the rural base. Further manual employment opportunities are provided by 
the Fort Cox Agricultural College which is situated across the valley from Bumshill. 
Bumshill's relative 'prosperity' within the Keiskarnmahoek district means that the community 
is able to support a greater level of informal sector employment activity than the poorer 
communities of Rabula and Chatha. Furthermore, the higher education levels within 
Bumshill place the residents in a better position than their counterparts in the other two 
villages studied to exploit informal sector opportunities close to home. Diverse examples of 
informal sector activity are found. These include: 
an ex-building labourer offering plastering services to the community15; 
a housewife of a small family offering laundry services to the community; and 
14Burnshill's relative prosperity is demonstrated in Table 9 in Chapter 3. 
15This individual was sub-contracted by the builders undertaking improvements to the local high school. 
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an ex-government driver using his 'bakkie' (purchased with his retirement gratuity) 
as a taxi on the route between Middledrift and Keiskammahoek. 
The higher levels of education within Burnshill have meant that it has a notably higher 
proportion of teachers than the other two villages. Some of these teachers have been able 
to fill local teaching posts in Bumshill and in nearby villages. Residents of Rabula and 
Chatha, with their relatively lower education levels and less advantageous economic position, 
have not had the same high level of access to such opportunities. 
The unemployment rate varied greatly across the three viilages (see Table 7), with 
significantly higher unemployment rates in Rabula and Chatha than Burnshill. A person has 
been classified as 'unemployed' if he or she: 
- is between the ages of 16 and 60; and 
- is not currently furthering their education on a full time basis; and 
- is currently attempting to find a job; or 
- has attempted to find a job within the last month. 
Thus, housewives, pensioners and farmers are not regarded as officially 'unemployed'. 
Unemployment Rate. 
Amongst Total Amongst Rural 
Sample Residents 
Rabula 24% 39% 
Bum shill 15% 23% 
Chatha 26% 42% 
Table 7: Unemployment 
The unemployment rate amongst the rural economically active population is high. The rural 
unemployment figures of 39 per cent and 42 per cent in Rabula and Chatha respectively 
exceed the average unemployment figure of the Development Bank of Southern Africa (1990) 
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for development sub-region D5 16 of 32.1 per cent. Only Bumshill has a rate below the 
Development Bank's estimate of 25 per cent unemployment in Development Region D 
(Eastern Cape, Border, Ciskei and Transkei) as a whole. 
The high unemployment (especially in the Rabula and Chatha) is underlined when one 
considers that Table 7 only shows active job-seekers as a percentage of the economically 
active population and does not reflect the severe under-employment in the region. Thus, 
the above figures should be regarded as the minimum conceivable levels of unemployment 
as they do not include any measure of under-employment which, without any doubt, is a 
significant feature of labour usage in the area. 
At the time of the survey, many people who termed themselves farmers had not cultivated 
their land, or only cultivated a portion of their land, that season. Some families had up to 
three members who termed themselves housewives even though it was extremely unlikely that 
household chores kept all the recorded 'housewives' busy on a full time basis. This is 
especially true when one considers that pensioners and school-children generally play a 
significant role in the completion of such chores. If one looks at the percentage of the 
economically active population that is not earning cash income (Table 8), one can see that 
these percentages vastly exceed the recorded unemployment rates. 
Percentage of Economically Active 
Population Not Earning Cash Incomes: 
Across the Total In the Rural 
Sample Area 
Rabula 38% 78% 
Bum shill 27% 48% 
Chatha 44% 87% 
Table 8: Persons Not Earning Cash Incomes 
16Tb.is sub-region covers the towns of Cathcart, Centane, East London, Gcuwa, Keiskammahoek, 
Middledrift, King William's Town, Mdantsane, Zwelitsha, Nqamakwe, Stutterheim and Tsomo. 
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The rates in Table 8 provide theoretical maxima for the unemployment rate. Whilst this 
ceiling measure is open to severe criticism for including as 'unemployed' persons who term 
themselves housewives and farmers, it does provide a means of identifying those people in 
the community that are potentially under-employed. By combining Tables 7 and 8, it is 
possible to obtain a conceivable range for the actual unemployment figure. 
By looking at a village's average household size (and thus 'volume' of household chores) and 
degree of agricultural activity, one can surmise whether the unemployment figure will be 
closer to the upper or lower end of its range. For example: 
the larger household sizes and relatively greater access to agricultural land in Rabula 
imply a greater volume of household and agricultural tasks and suggest that Rabula's 
actual unemployment rate would be closer to the lower end of its unemployment 
range than would Chatha's, where families and fields are smaller; and 
the presence of taps amongst the houses in Burnshill decreases the amount of time 
needed for household chores which, coupled with the low levels of agricultural 
activity, increases the chance that actual unemployment figures in Burnshill approach 
the upper end of their potential range. 
Thus, given Table 7 and 8, it is quite possible that a more realistic estimate of unemployment 




This chapter looks at sources of rural income, and attempts to assess the standard of living 
in the three villages. In order to do this it is necessary to carefully define the concept of 
'income' as it pertains to a rural household. 
3.1. The Definition of 'Household Income' 
The definition of income used in this study is that of Simons (1938: 50), who 
comprehensively defines income per period as: 
the sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the 
change in value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end 
of the period. 
Attention is also paid to the admonition of the Minority Report of the Royal Commission on 
the Taxation of Profits and Income (1955: 355), which, in embracing Simons' income 
definition, warns of the dangers of using less complete definitions: 
No concept of income can be really equitable that stops short of the 
comprehensive definition which embraces all receipts which increase an 
individual's command over the use of society's scarce resources - in other 
words, his "net accretion of economic power between two points in time". 
Utilising the above definition in the calculation of rural household income, is practically very 
difficult due to the presence of a significant number of in-kind transactions in the rural areas, 
and leads to the use of proxies such as 'cash income' (for example, De Wet et al., 1992). 
However, the Royal Commission is effectively warning against making welfare judgements 
on this basis. Analysis of rural households' allocation of time and remittance behaviour 
shows a number of reasons why cash income is not a suitable proxy for household income: 
(1) Many households devote significant amounts of time to agriculture and have no cash 
income to show for it. If in such cases one only considers cash income as a measure 
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of household welfare, one is effectively ascribing economic irrationality to households 
that devote resources to any activity not specifically aimed at earning cash income. 
(2) Analysis of cash income levels alone ignores agricultural differences between 
households. Thus it is necessary to consider income-in-kind from agriculture, both 
from stock farming and cultivation (of both homestead gardens and arable land). 
(3) Households in the three villages are heavily reliant on remittances from household 
members living away from the rural base. These remittances can be in one of three 
forms: 
(a) Cash remittances; 
(b) Remittances-in-kind (i.e. goods, normally groceries, brought by the family 
member to the rural household when he or she visits); and 
( c) Account payments by migrant workers and commuters at their place of work 
for goods 'consumed' at the rural base. In many instances, households decide 
that instead of remitting cash, a household member working away from the 
rural base should purchase a specific good on account and have it delivered 
to the rural area. The member concerned then pays for it by stop order on his 
or her salary. By undertaking this a household is clearly reducing its 
transaction costs, thereby increasing the efficiency of remittances. 
Hence, if one was to only measure cash income, one would exclude remittances of 
type (b) and type (c). 
In light of Simons' definition of income and the aforementioned shortcomings of using cash 
income as a proxy, it is necessary to develop a comprehensive measure of income that 
includes income-in-kind in all its possible forms as well as changes in the value of household 
assets over the period in question. To do this, Simons' concept of income is applied to the 
following three traditional 'problem' areas in the measurement of rural income: 
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i) Income from crop farming; 
ii) Income from stock farming; and 
iii) Remittance income. 
i) Income from Crops 
The crop income figures calculated for the purposes of this survey cover the twelve months 
ending 30 September 1990 (and thus include the 1989/1990 summer crop and 1990 winter 
crop). The total crop income figure is obtained by adding net cash receipts and income-in-
kind. Net cash receipts include all cash received from sale of crops less the cash paid for 
crop cultivation inputs. In most instances, this amount was negative as the household bought 
a variety of inputs for cultivation and derived no cash receipts from crop farming. 
In order to calculate income-in-kind from agriculture, two problems had to be surmounted: 
(1) Yields had to be estimated for households that could not supply accurate yield 
figures: This was done by calculating average yields for the various crops in the 
different villages on the basis of all recorded yields in the village, and applying these 
averages to the areas planted in order to estimate unrecorded yields. For crops where 
there were too few recorded yields to calculate an average yield for the village, an 
average yield across the three villages was used. Where possible, distinctions were 
made between yields in fields and in homestead gardens. Separate wet and dry land 
yields were calculated. 
(2) Values had to be placed on crops consumed by the household: 'Own consumption 
of crops' was valued on the basis of the average prices for the different crops in the 
area. The average price of a particular crop was based on all recorded transactions 
involving that crop within the community. 
Where a family 'share-cropped', their income was recorded net of their payment-in-kind to 
the land-owner or land-holder. For a land-owner or land-holder who let out his or her land 
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in a share-cropping arrangement, the payment received was recorded as crop income-in-kind 
for the household. 
Details of all yields and average prices used in the estimation of income-in-kind are given 
in Appendix D. 
ii) Income from Stock 
Accurately defining income from stock farming is extremely problematic. Recording cash 
sales of stock during a year does not give a realistic measure of income from stock farming, 
since, by selling stock, a household is merely converting from an illiquid, to a liquid asset. 
In fact, using cash sales of stock as a measure of stock income could prove highly 
distortionary. In depressed economic times, poorer families with low incomes may be forced 
to sell off stock whilst wealthier families are able to hold on to stock. If cash proceeds from 
stock sales were used to measure income, income would be credited to poorer families in 
situations where they could well have incurred a loss by selling an asset for less than its 
market value. Also, it could lead to an unrealistic equality in recorded 'income' figures if, 
across the sample, poorer families rather than wealthier ones were selling off stock. 
To get around this, it is necessary to use a more sophisticated method that records the change 
in household wealth, from the beginning of the year to end of the year, resulting from 
household stockholding activities. · Thus income from stock was calculated by summing the 
following three amounts: 
(a) the increase (decrease) in value of stockholding from the start to the end of the twelve 
month period prior to the commencement of the survey; 
(b) the net increase (decrease) in cash holdings due to stock transactions during the 
twelve month period (including all expenditure on new stock, feed and veterinary 
services); and 
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(c) the value of stock consumed by the household during the same twelve month period. 
It must be noted that in quite a few instances either amount (a), amount (b), or both, were 
negative resulting in a net loss from stock farming. 
Thus, in order to arrive at stock farming incomes it was necessary to know the values of the 
various types of stock. The values used were obtained from records of transactions within 
the community and are detailed in Appendix E. 
iii) Remittance Income 
As has already been mentioned above, recording cash remittances alone under-estimates the 
true remittance income to the rural areas, and ascribes economic irrationality on the part of 
all who remit in-kind, or in the form of account payments. In order to measure the change 
in the wealth of a rural household due to remittances, one has to sum cash remittances, 
remittances-in-kind and remittances in the form of account payments. 
3.2. Household Income Levels 
Table 9 shows both average annual household 'income' (defined according to the principles 
discussed above) and average household annual 'cash receipts' 17 for the three villages: 
17The purpose of looking at cash receipts is not to provide any measure of household welfare, but to ensure 
continuity with prior work in the area and assess the liquidity position of the households. 
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Average Rural Household Average Rural Household 




1990 194919 (1949-90) 1990 1949 (1949-90) 
Rabula R8572 R1082 5.2% R6388 R940 4.8% 
Bum shill R11032 R1423 5.1% R9082 Rl315 4.8% 
Chatha R3998 R1515 2.4% R3202 R1067 2.7% 
Table 9: Household Income Levels20 
Table 9 demonstrates that households in Bumshill are clearly the most prosperous of the 
three villages, both in terms of cash receipts and income. In fact, the aggregated income of 
the Bumshill sample was 75 per cent that of the Rabula sample and 160 per cent that of the 
Chatha sample, despite the Bumshill sample being 58 per cent of the size of the Rabula and 
Chatha samples. 
The figure of R6388 for 1990 average annual household cash receipts in Rabula is higher 
than the 1990 figure of R5644 found by De Wet et al. (1992: 29). This difference would 
appear to be due to the difference in samples. However, the 1990 average household cash 
receipts figure for Rabula of R6388 represents an annual real increase of 4 per cent from 
De Wet's 1987 nominal cash receipts R3831 (R5644 in 1990 terms). 
From Table 9, it can also be seen that in 1949 Chatha in fact enjoyed the highest income 
levels. Chatha's 'affluence' in 1949 was largely due to the local employment opportunities 
in forestry at the time that have long since ceased to exist. Since 1949 average household 
18Certain definitional differences exist between the 1949 and 1990 'income' figures. Income in 1949 does 
not include remittances-in-kind and remittances in the form of account payments. Also, the 1949 household 
income-in-kind from stock farming is simply taken to be the family's 'own-consumption-of-stock' regardless 
of whether the household's stockholding has risen or fallen in value over the year. 
19Tbe 1949 real income levels (in Rands) have been calculated using the South African consumer price index 
(Central Statistical Services, 1992: 8.20), on the basis that £1 equals R2. 
20Caiculated from the figures of Houghton and Walton (1952: 106) 
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real income in Chatha has grown at approximately half the rate of Rabula and Burnshill. 
Rabula has enjoyed a practically identical growth rate to Burnshill since 1949 albeit off a 
significantly lower base. Burnshill's success at accessing the regional cash economy appears 
to be evidenced in the 1949 data by the fact that, even in 1949, Burnshill households had the 
highest average annual cash receipts. 
3.3 The Components of Household Income 
Table 10 gives the percentage breakdown of the components of incomes across the three 
villages. The different sources of household income will be dealt with individually below. 
Income from within the Area Income from outside the Area 
Cash Private Other Remit. in 
Wages/ Govt. /Work Cash Net Net Remit. the Form 
Earn- Pen- Pen- Earn- Crop Stock Cash in of Ale 
ings sions sions ings21 Income Income Remit. Kind Payments 
Rabula: 22.05% 24.87% 1.79% 0.15% 3.15% 4.74% 24.78% 9.26% 9.20% 
B'hill22 21.61% 19.15% 4.30% 0.90% 0.36% 2.21% 32.40% 10.81 % 8.25% 
Chatha 5.94% 34.38% 2.03% 0.56% 4.80% 2.57% 37.21 % 6.82% 5.68% 
Table 10: Breakdown of Household Income 
i) Cash Earnings within the Area 
Rabula and Burnshill rely on cash wages and earnings generated within the area for 
approximately one fifth of their total income23, compared with 5 per cent in the case of 
Chatha. As was indicated in Chapter 2, Burnshill has the highest proportion of wage-earners 
21 '0ther cash earnings' are mainly in the form of rental income and the once-off receipt of 'damages' in 
the case of an unplanned pregnancy in the family. 
22These figures from Burnshill are calculated excluding one household in the sample that constitutes a 
significant outlier in terms of the head of the household, as an ex-official in the Sebe regime, having just been 
paid out an unusually large pension relative to other household income flows in the village. 
23This result for Rabula is heavily dependent on two salary-earners living at the rural base, who earn 
particularly high salaries. The percentage of the rural population earning cash incomes, as well as the average 
local cash earnings per household, is notably lower for Rabula than Burnshill. 
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resident at the rural base, largely due to its geographic and educational advantages relative 
to local employment opportunities. 
What is clear from Table 10 is that Chatha has been excluded from local employment 
opportunities. This is due both to its lower education levels and isolated geographic location. 
The importance of geographic location vis-a-vis job opportunities has been documented by 
De Wet and Leibbrandt (forthcoming) who point out that Rabula's 'prosperity' relative to 
Chatha has emerged since the 1949 survey. As has already been mentioned, at the time of 
the 1949 survey, Chatha had certain locational advantages over Rabula (in the form of local 
job opportunities in forestry). Since then Chatha's relative advantage in forestry employment 
opportunities has fallen away, and Rabula has been able to capitalise on the development of 
Dimbaza and its better geographical position relative to the Ciskei capital, Bisho (a source 
of bureaucratic jobs), and King Williams' Town. 
As has already been seen, Burnshill has even greater locational opportunities than Rabula 
with its close proximity to Fort Cox and the Zanyokwe Irrigation Scheme. 
ii) Pensions 
The Chatha sample is reliant on the Ciskei government pension, granted in the case of old-
age or disability, for over 30 per cent of its income, compared with a figure of 25 per cent 
and 19 per cent for Rabula and Burnshill respectively. At the time of the survey, the Ciskei 
government pension amounted to R300 every two months for all individuals over 60 years 
of age or those that qualify for a so-called 'sick pension' (disability grant). This high degree 
of reliance on government pensions is extremely worrying in light of the political uncertainty 
surrounding the issue of homelands in a future political dispensation. Already at the time 
of this survey, people were starting to voice concerns over the possible non-payment of 
pensions in the future. 
Burnshill shows a greater proportion of its income coming from private pension schemes than 
the other two villages, indicative of the higher level of jobs that Burnshill residents have been 
able to obtain for a number of years. 
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iii) Crop Income 
In all three villages, agricultural income (stock and crop) counted for less than 10 per cent 
of total income (7.9 per cent, 2.6 per cent and 7.4 per cent in Rabula, Burnshill and Chatha 
respectively). This represents a decrease in reliance on agriculture in all three villages since 
the 1949 survey when Rabula, Bumshill and Chatha relied on agriculture for 19.9 per cent, 
9.0 per cent and 25.3 per cent of their income respectively (Houghton and Walton, 1952: 
106). 
However, despite such low reliance on agricultural income, agriculture remains a viable use 
of household time given the under-employment and unemployment in the area and the very 
low levels of many household incomes. Thus, the lesser importance of agricultural income 
in Bumshill, to a certain degree, reflects the lower levels of unemployment in Burnshill than 
in the other two villages. 
The low degree of importance of agricultural income for Bumshill is evidence of both: 
a low level of agricultural involvement; and 
relatively high levels of non-agricultural incomes in the village. 
Indeed, this minor emphasis on agriculture in Burnshill dates back to 1949, when already it 
was found by Houghton and Walton (1952: 106) that Burnshill was less than half as reliant 
on agriculture than either Rabula or Chatha. 
The crop income was particularly low in Bumshill, despite Burnshill's fields falling under 
the Zanyokwe Irrigation Scheme. Indeed, the scheme provides an example of a top-down 
development scheme that is not achieving the desired results on the ground. The scheme 
originally intended to lease fields from land-owners for three years in order to install the 
irrigation. Over this period, it was intended that land-owners work for the scheme so they 
could receive some training to enable them to farm their land efficiently after the three-year 
development period. However, land-owners appear unenthusiastic about working for the 
scheme and are, by and large, quite content to receive rental for their land and devote their 
time to other activities. In many cases, the older generation of quitrent households are 




Rabula, compared with R221 in Chatha), due to the far greater area of land cultivated by the 
Rabula sample. However, due to the low levels of Chatha's other sources of income, crop 
income is a relatively more important component of overall income in Chatha than in Rabula. 
iv) Stock Income 
Stock income was a more important component of income than crop income in both Rabula 
and Burnshill, whilst in Chatha the reverse situation was found. The lower absolute amount 
of average household stock inc~me in Chatha is explained by Chatha's lower average 
household investment in stockholding (see Table 11). 
The dry conditions prevailing at the time of the survey were cited as a problem by many of 
the households in all three villages and are probably partly to blame for the low average 
household annual stock income figures of R406, R233 and Rl 78 for Rabula, Burnshill and 
Chatha respectively. 
Table 11 shows the beginning of the year and end of year average value of household 
stockholding25 : 
D 
Average Value of Household Stockholding 
Start-of-year End-of-year Percentage Increase 
October 1989 September 1990 (decrease) over the Year. 
Rabula R5376 R5449 1.36% 
Bum shill R3388 R3303 (2.51 %) 
Chatha R2217 R2005 (9.56%) 
Table 11: Household Stockholdin& 
As can be seen, there is a significant investment in stock in the area. If income from stock 
farming in each area is taken as a percentage of the value of beginning-of-year stock, a real 
25Details of the stock prices used to value herds are given in Appendix E. 
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private return on investment in stock of 7.6 per cent, 6.9 per cent and 8.0 per cent for 
Rabula, Bumshill and Chatha respectively is recorded. These returns compare favourably 
with other real returns open to families with limited access (due to educational factors) to 
'modem sector' savings and investment opportunities, particularly when the fact that 
individual households do not face private costs of grazing is considered. Thus, investment 
in stock should not be merely seen as a culturally driven form of savings, but a rational 
investment in a 'profitable' asset. 
In Rabula and Bumshill, land-owning families had significantly higher average values of 
stockholding than other non-land-owning households. In Rabula, the average year-end 
household stockholding of freehold families was valued at R8001, compared with R3384 for 
other families. In Bumshill, the quitrenters had a value of average year-end stockholding of 
R49oo26, compared with the Rl 706 for landless families and squatters. The higher average 
stockholding of land-owners would appear to be due to the fact that these families (in both 
Rabula and Bumshill) are the better established households in the community. They also 
have access to slightly better grazing in the form of unplanted freehold fields and can make 
use of the remains of their crops in their fields if they planted. 
v) Remittances and Migrant Labour Patterns 
As can be seen from Table 10, 43 per cent, 51 per cent and 50 per cent of total rural 
household income in Rabula, Bumshill and Chatha respectively, is derived from household 
members living away from the rural base, either in the form of cash remittances or 
remittances-in-kind (in the form of goods or account payments)27 • If rural cash receipts are 
analysed on their own, it can be seen that 33 per cent, 41 per cent and 47 per cent of total 
rural cash receipts are in the form of cash remittances. This is remarkably different from 
the situation in 1949 where Rabula, Bumshill and Chatha derived 47 per cent, 21 per cent 
26This figure includes the single freehold family in the Bumshill sample. 
27These measures greatly exceed the figures of Simkins (1984: 6) who, at macroeconomic level, estimated 
that on average (in the years 1960, 1970 and 1980) remittances constituted 25.6 per cent of total earnings in 
the homelands. The large difference appears to be explained by both the exclusion of remittances-in-kind from 
Simkins' estimates and obvious differences in the level of reliance on remittances across different homelands. 
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and 30 per cent of total income and 51 per cent, 22 percent and 28 per cent of their cash 
receipts respectively from remittances from outside the magisterial district. As can be seen, 
Rabula was much more heavily dependent on remittances in 1949 than it is today, while the 
opposite is true for Chatha. This appears to be due to the fact that although in 1949 Chatha 
had access to greater local wage employment than Rabula (in the from of forestry work), this 
situation has reversed over time, with Rabula, today, enjoying greater wage earning 
opportunities. 
Table 10 shows that currently, Bumshill and Chatha enjoy the highest proportion of income 
from outside the rural area, albeit for different reasons. In Bumshill, this is explained by 
the high level of average household remittances (from relatively skilled workers), whilst in 
Chatha it is due to the low levels of income from within the area, rather than a high absolute 
level of remittances. This can be seen in Table 12 which shows that the Bumshill sample 
receives the highest level of household remittances (125 per cent and 232 per cent of the 
levels of Rabula and Chatha respectively). 
Average Household Remittances 
In-kind 
in the form of: 
Cash Goods Account Payments Total 
Rabula R2124 R794 R788 R3706 
Bumshill R2908 R969 R740 R4617 
Chatha R1488 R272 R227 R1987 
Table 12: A veraae Household Remittances 
Thus far, no distinction has been made between different types of remittances. However, 
for the purposes of this survey, given the villages' differing abilities to access the regional 
economy, it is useful to distinguish between three different categories of people who remit 
to the rural base: 
(a) short term commuters - who live away from the rural base for the purpose of work 
and visit the home at least once a month; 
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{b) long term migrants - who live away from the rural base for the purpose of work, 
and maintain their links with the rural base by remitting or visiting at least once a 
year; and 
(c) members of separate households - who remit to the sample household. These 
usually are married children who still remit to their parents despite having their own 
households. However, in most cases once children have their own household, 
remittances go to their household and no longer to that of their parents. 
If one analyses the percentage breakdown of remittances on this basis (Table 13), one sees 
a remarkably different situation in each of the three villages. 
Average Annual Household Receipts of Remittances from: 
(percentage of total household income given in brackets) 
Short Term Commuters Long Term Migrants Separate Households 
in the Form of: in the Form of: in the Form of: 
Cash Goods Account Cash Goods Account Cash Goods Account 
Payments Payments Payments 
Rabula R980 R563 R510 R1144 R231 R278 0 0 0 
(11.4%) (6.6%) (6.0%) (13.3%) (2.7%) (3.3%) 
B'hill R2517 RSS6 R490 R309 R408 R250 R82 RS 0 
(22.8%) (S.0%) (4.4%) (2.8%) (3.7%) (2.3%) (0.7%) (0.1 %) 
Chatha R318 R96 R59 R1056 R120 R168 R114 RS6 0 
(8.0%) (2.4%) (1.5%) (26.4%) (3.0%) (4.2%) (2.8%) (1.4%) 
Table 13: Breakdown of Remittances by Source 
From Table 13 it can be seen that whilst Rabula receives a similar proportion of its total 
income from short term commuters (24%) and its long term migrants (19.3%), there are 
distinct differences in these proportions in both the Bumshill and Chatha sample: 
In the Bumshill sample 32.2 per cent of total income came from short term 
commuters whilst only 8. 8 per cent of total income came from long term migrants; 
Long term migrants contribute 33.6 per cent of the total income of the Chatha 
sample, with short term commuters only contributing 11.9 per cent of total income. 
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This dichotomy in migrant labour behaviour between villages also emerges in the breakdown 
of migrants between short term commuters and long term migrants (Table 14). 
D 
Percentage Breakdown of People Away from 
the Rural Base for Purposes of Work 
Short Term Commuters Long Term Migrants 
Rabula 41% 59% 
Burn shill 57% 43% 
Chatha 18% 82% 
Table 14: Breakdown of Mierants by Type 
People away from Burnshill for purposes of work are mainly short term commuters, whilst 
those away from Chatha are predominantly long term migrants. The situation in Rabula falls 
somewhere between these two extremes. 
This provides further evidence of the fact that Burnshill has been more successful than the 
other two villages in being incorporated into the mainstream of the Ciskei/Border regional 
economy. Migrants from Rabula and particularly Chatha have been forced to go further 
afield in search of work. Seventy-five per cent of all Burnshill migrants work in the 
immediate Ciskei/Border region, compared to 49 per cent and 22 per cent of migrants from 
Rabula and Chatha respectively. This demonstrates the different extent of reliance of the 
three villages on the Ciskei civil service and decentralisation policy. Thus, Burnshill and to 
a lesser, but still considerable extent, Rabula, will be the most seriously affected by any 
alterations in homeland and regional policy that cut regional bureaucratic jobs. 
Burnshill's success in the Ciskei economy appears to be partly due to its history of political 
power in the district. Burnshill was the first village in the district where Betterment Planning 
was implemented. This early acceptance of Betterment Planning gained Burnshill valuable 
grazing land from the adjacent village of Debe Nek (which initially resisted 'betterment'). 
Burnshill was also the seat of the old Southern Tribal Authority, which furnished the village 
considerable political clout. Evidence of this influence is found in the fact that Burnshill was 
selected as the site of the headquarters of the Zanyokwe Irrigation Scheme and is one of the 
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only villages in the district with taps in the streets. Both these facts are of considerable 
economic advantage to the village today. 
As has been discussed before, Bumshill's other major advantage is education. An analysis 
of the skill levels of the various categories of migrants (Table 15) shows a situation that 
contradicts conventional wisdom about migration: that it is the best qualified people that are 
most likely to migrate furthest (to the large urban centre) from the rural base. 
Percentage Breakdown of Migrants by 
Skill Level and Type of Migrant 
Skilled Semi-skilled Unskilled 
Rabula - Commuters 28% 34% 38% 
- Migrants 6% 19% 75% 
Bum shill - Commuters 63% 19% 19% 
- Migrants 42% 25% 33% 
Chatha - Commuters 11% 33% 56% 
- Migrants - 10% 90% 
Table 15: Breakdown of Short Tenn Commuters and 
Loni Tenn Mi1rants by Skill Level 
Table 15 clearly shows a tendency for skilled workers to travel shorter distances than less 
skilled workers in their search for jobs (i.e. become 'short term commuters' rather than 'long 
term migrants'). Thus, it is the skilled people (teachers, nurses, agricultural extension 
workers, etc.) and, to a slightly lesser extent, the semi-skilled workers (police, mechanics, 
low level clerks, etc.) that are able to take advantage of the Ciskei regional economy, and 
the opportunities provided in the Ciskei civil service and decentralisation incentives. 
Chatha with its low levels of average education is dependent on long term migrants, 90 per 
cent of whom are unskilled. Amongst these long term migrants there was significant 
evidence of the value of 'homeboy networks' ('migrant networks') in the securing of 
employment. For example, a significant proportion of unskilled Chatha workers were 
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employed in two specific dairies in Cape Town and Port Elizabeth. At the lower skill levels, 
in the absence of formal education certificates, these networks provide a valuable way of 
transmitting economic information about job-seekers, lowering information costs for both 
potential employer and employee alike. In some instances these networks go as far as 
reducing some of the training costs for employers. Much has been written on the importance 
of such networks, both in South Africa (Mayer, 1961) and elsewhere (particularly in the case 
of Mexican workers migrating to America (Mines and De Jenvry, 1982)). 
The interaction of skill levels and the spread of long term and short term migrants within the 
two villages explains the different average remittances across the villages. Bumshill 
migrants, being more highly skilled, get better jobs closer to home, thereby retaining closer 
links with the rural base. This leads to greater remittances by workers from Bumshill. On 
the other hand, long term unskilled migrants from Chatha by and large achieve only low 
paying employment and, due to their more distant relationship with the home base, remit 
less. 
In a study of migrants in Botswana, Lucas and Stark (1985) examine possible determinants 
of migrants' remittances, identifying four main motivations for remitting, each of which 
appears plausible, to a greater or lesser degree, in light of the findings of this study. They 
suggest that: 
(a) Migrants' remittances are positively related to the degree of altruism on the part 
of the migrant. They further noted that the migrant's altruism towards his or her 
family fades as the migrant has less contact with the home base. This confirms 
Tullock's (1982) view that altruism, in general, as a motive for redistribution, 'fades' 
as the distance (both geographically and socially) between the source and recipient of 
redistribution increases. This provides an explanation for why Bumshill, with its 
relatively high proportion of short term commuters working near to the rural base, 
has the highest level of remittances. 
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(b) Migrants' remittances are a positive function of migrants' wages. This constitutes 
a further reason why migrants from Bumshill, who are generally the most skilled and 
consequently hold the best paid jobs, remit the most. 
(c) To a certain extent, the remittances of migrants constitute a 'repayment' to the 
family for past investment by the family in the migrant's education. Thus, Lucas 
and Stark predict that migrants who embody the highest level of human capital 
investment on the part of their family investment, will exhibit the highest level of 
remittances. This prediction provides a further reason as to why well-educated 
Bumshill migrants remit the most. 
(d) Migrants' remittances can in some ways be viewed as a contribution towards a 
migrants' retirement to the rural base, and allow the migrant to maintain a 
'stake' in the rural base if he or she stands to ultimately inherit the rural base. 
Once again this provides a plausible reason as to why Bumshill exhibits the highest 
level of remittances. A detailed look at Bumshill remittances shows that the bulk of 
remittances is in fact located in the quitrent households, and quitrent title to land can 
be transferred via inheritance. Lucas and Stark suggest that this possibility of 
inheriting the quitrent title provides a valid motivation for remitting, particularly in 




LIVING STANDARDS AND VILLAGE INCOME INEQUALITY 
In Chapter 3, whilst income levels and sources were compared across the three villages, no 
attempt was made to assess the adequacy of this income. Table 9 shows the average level 
of household income and cash receipts, but does not take into account the differences in 
household size across the three villages (see Table 1). A start is made in this regard in Table 
16 which shows the levels of per capita income and cash receipts across the three villages. 
Average Per Capita Average Per Capita 
Rural Household Rural Household 
'Income' 'Cash Receipts' 
Rabula R1308 R975 
Burn shill R1825 R1502 
Chatha R875 R687 
Table 16: Per Capita Income 
However, whilst Table 16 confirms the already noted ranking of prosperity across the three 
villages (from Chatha, the poorest, to Burnshill, the wealthiest), it does not enable one to 
make an assessment of the standard of living in the three villages. This chapter looks at 
some of the problems in making such an assessment, and considers both the adequacy and 
distribution of village income. 
4.1. An Assessment of Poverty Within the Three Villages 
The question as to whether or not an household is impoverished is always, to a certain 
extent, emotive. Answering this question involves testing household income against some 
'poverty base line', and the choice of a base line is necessarily subjective. Beckerman 
(1984: 6) identifies two types of poverty lines: 'absolute poverty lines' and 'relative 
poverty lines', noting that: 
The former concept is supposed to correspond to some bare minimum 
subsistence line, whereas the latter is designed to reflect the fact that people 
can still be "poor" even well above the subsistence level, in the sense that they 
fall below what is required by the society in which they live as the minimum 
level of command over goods and services needed in order to be a fully 
integrated member of that society. 
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Given the above distinction, it is clear that all of the households surveyed are poor relative 
to what is considered the norm in modem urban centres. Bumshill is the only village with 
access to clean drinking water, having taps located at regular intervals within the village. 
Residents of Rabula and Chatha only have access to river water for drinking and washing, 
with the river being up to a two hour round trip from some homesteads. None of the 
villages has electricity, with paraffin and firewood constituting the chief sources of energy. 
However, determining the extent of absolute poverty in the three villages is a more difficult 
task. To do this, one has to choose an absolute poverty line, and as Beckerman (1984) 
points out, it is difficult to assess the absolute minimum requirements of a family. He goes 
on to note that an analysis of poverty cannot be independent of time, as the question as to 
how long a person or household has been poor is an important one and the answer to it 
necessarily influences a person's or household's ability to escape from poverty. Thus, in the 
assessment of absolute poverty across the villages use is made of both a short term and long 
term poverty datum line, namely the household subsistence level (HSL) and household 
effective level (BEL), as defined by Potgieter (199la and 1991b). 
The HSL is defined as: 
an estimate of the theoretical income needed by an individual household if it 
is to maintain a defined minimum level of health and decency in the short 
term. It is calculated at the lowest retail cost of a budget of necessities of 
adequate quality (Potgieter, 1991b: 4) (emphasis added). 
The words 'theoretical' and 'short term' have been stressed for in practice, in the long term, 
the HSL does not provide a realistic minimum level of income with which to judge a 
household's sustainable quality of life. In this regard, Potgieter's HEL is a more suitable 
measure. Potgieter (1991b: 7) states that the HEL of income is: 
that (level of income) which, after one third of it has been allocated to other 
items28, is equal to the cost of the HSL requirements for that household. 
This implies that the HEL is equal to 150 per cent of the HSL. 
40 
Effectively the HSL is calculated to cover the most basic physiological needs (food, clothing, 
fuel, lighting, cleansing materials and transport), whilst the HEL includes items like medical 
services, education, pension and household equipment that all contribute to the household's 
longer term welfare and quality of life. 
In order to heed both Cross and Preston-Whyte's (1984) warning that household poverty 
cannot be judged independently of household structure and Beckerman's (1984) counsel that 
account be taken of the fact that individual minimum needs vary, unique HSL and HEL 
measures were calculated for each household surveyed. Using poverty data from the nearby 
Ciskei town of Peddie (Potgieter, 1991a: 38 and 59)29, an individual 'subsistence level' a.nd 
an 'effective level' were calculated for each family member (according to their age and sex), 
and these were summed across each family to obtain that household's unique HSL and HEL. 
Ratios of household income to HSL and to HEL and household cash receipts to HSL and 
HEL were then calculated for each household. Table 17 shows the average of the household 
ratios of income to HSL and cash receipts to HSL in each of the three villages: 
D Average Household Average Household Ratio Ratio of Income : HSL of Cash Receipts : HSL 
Rabula 1.31 0.98 
Bum shill 1.60 1.35 
Chatha 0.81 0.66 
Table 17: Household Income and Cash Receipts 
as Ratios of the HSL 
28 '0ther items' include expenditure on health services, recreation, transport and pensions. 
29The March 1991 figures given in Potgieter (1991a) were deflated back to September 1990 (the end of the 
twelve month survey period) using the consumer price index (Central Statistical Services, 1992: 8.20). 
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This shows that on average the household cash receipts in Rabula and Chatha are insufficient 
to maintain the family above absolute poverty in the short run. However, if one includes 
non-cash income in the calculation, only Chatha households, on average, remain below the 
HSL30• 
It is perhaps more telling to look at the percentage of households in each village that have 
incomes and cash receipts below the HSL: 
Percentage of Households with: 
Income Below Cash Receipts 
their HSL Below their HSL 
Rabula 32% 63% 
Bum shill 36% 50% 
Chatha 66% 82% 
Table 18: Households with Incomes Below the HSL 
From Table 18, the relative plight of Chatha is clear: 66 per cent of the households in the 
Chatha sample are living below the HSL in the short term, compared to 32 per cent in 
Rabula and 36 per cent in Bumshill. In light of Potgieter's definitions of the HSL (1991b: 
4-10), these households are not meeting their basic physiological needs in the short run. 
Table 18 also shows that in each village over 50 per cent of the households cannot cater for 
their basic needs out of cash incomes alone, and demonstrates the continued importance of 
the pursuit of non-cash income. 
The high level of short term need outlined above, forewarns about the inability of many 
households to sustain a minimum quality of life in the long term. Table 19 shows the 
3°In interpreting these results it must be remembered that non-cash income is still likely to be an under-
estimate in the sense that it does not include income from chickens, milk and green maize (see explanations in 
Appendix D and E). However, given the relatively small importance of agriculture in total income, this 
omission is unlikely to change the results significantly. 
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average household ratios of income to HEL and cash receipts to HEL in each of the three 
villages. 
Average Household Average Household Ratio 
Ratio of Income : HEL of Cash Receipts : HEL 
Rabula 0.87 0.65 
Bumshill 1.07 0.90 
Chatha 0.54 0.44 
Table 19: Household Income and Cash Receipts 
as Ratios of the HEL 
It can be seen that, with the exception of Bumshill, household income, on average, is below 
the HEL. In all cases, cash receipts are, on average, less than the HEL. 
Percentage of Households with: 
Income Below Cash Receipts 
their HEL Below their HEL 
Rabula 71% 89% 
Bum shill 50% 68% 
Chatha 87% 97% 
Table 20: Households with Incomes below the HEL 
Table 20 shows that in each village (including Bumshill where on average household incomes 
are 107 per cent of the HEL), at least half of the households have incomes below their 
HEL's. This hints at serious inequality in income within villages. The inequality in income 
will be examined in detail later in this chapter. 
If one takes the three villages studied as representative of the Keiskammahoek District as a 
whole (bearing in mind that they exhibit lower dependency ratios than the Ciskei average), 
Table 20 suggests that over 50 per cent of households in the district do not have sufficient 
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income to maintain a decent quality of life in the long term (i.e. they cannot provide 
themselves with adequate medical services and pensions). This inability to fulfil long term 
needs (and as has been seen in many instances, short term physiological needs) undoubtedly 
has an adverse effect on productivity levels which, in tum, impacts negatively on all 
household agricultural, job and educational achievement, thereby preventing households from 
achieving higher income levels. In essence, a 'vicious circle of poverty' exists, in the sense 
that the very effects of poverty prevent families from achieving the productivity levels 
necessary to break free from poverty. Thus, in the district, higher mortality rates and lower 
life expectancies than the South African national average can be expected. 
Tables 9 and 16-20 provide strong evidence as to the importance of non-cash incomes in the 
area. Referring back to Table 9, it can be seen that in Rabula, Bumshill and Chatha cash 
receipts are only 75 per cent, 79 per cent and 80 per cent of total household income 
respectively. Table 20 shows that only 3 per cent of the Chatha sample (i.e. one out of 38 
households) and 11 per cent of the Rabula sample have cash receipts that exceed the HEL. 
This highlights the inadequacy of the local cash economy to support the villages studied and 
clearly demonstrates the on-going importance of non-cash remittances and agricultural 
income-in-kind. Indeed, in light of local and urban job shortages, the rationality of rural 
households' continued involvement in local agriculture emerges, despite the extremely low 
productivity levels in agriculture. 
4.2. Village Income Distribution 
Whilst poverty exists within all three villages, an assessment of village welfare levels cannot 
be made without looking at the distribution of village income. Indeed, in South Africa, with 
its large rural population, inroads into the national income distribution problem cannot be 
made without a detailed knowledge of income distribution within the rural areas. 
The question of rural income inequality is complicated by the fact that 'rural household 
income' is an aggregation of a number of different sources of income, each with its own 
distinct effect on the overall distribution of income within the village. The strength and 
direction of these effects are important parameters for policy formulation and the analysis of 
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the impact of changes in household behaviour. For example, as shown previously, labour 
'out-migration' remains a significant socio-economic phenomenon in rural areas, and this 
begs the question as to whether such migration reduces or exaggerates rural income 
inequality, and what effect this inequality has on rural welfare levels. 
This section attempts to answer such questions by measuring the distribution of income 
within the three villages and assessing the contribution of the different sources of household 
income to total village income inequality. Firstly, the theoretical framework for this analysis 
will be outlined. Subsequently, this framework will be applied to the three villages surveyed. 
This analysis follows a similar structure to that of Stark, Taylor and Yitshaki's (1986 and 
1988) appraisal of different sources of income inequality in two Mexican villages. 
i) Theoretical Framework for the analysis of the Distribution of Village Income and Village 
Welfare Levels 
Assume that within a village there are n households deriving income from K different sources 
(i.e. K different income components). Following the notation in Shorrocks (1983: 311), let 
Yi denote the total income of household i, where i = 1, .. ,n and Yik the income of household 
i from source k, where k = 1, .. ,K. Thus: 
K 
y.=~y.k 
1 k-=1 1 
Also, let the distribution of total household income be represented by Y=(y1, •• ,yn) and the 
distribution of income component k be represented by Yk=(y1k,··,Yn1c). 
Using this notation, the Gini co-efficient (G) for the distribution of total income within the 
village can be defined as: 
G = 2cov[Y,F(Y)] 
µ 
(1) 
whereµ denotes village mean household income and F(Y) the 'cumulative rank distribution' 
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of total household income in the village (i.e. F{Y)={f(y1), .. ,f(y0 )) where f(y) is ·equal to the 
rank of Yi divided by the number of observations) (Stark et al., 1986: 259). 
Equation (1) can be rewritten and expanded into an expression for the Gini co-efficient that 
captures the 'contribution to inequality' of each of the K components of income: 
2 K 
- G = - L cov[Yk,F(Y)] 
µ k=l 
where µk is the village mean income from source k and F(Y k) is the cumulative rank 
distribution of income from source k (i.e. F(Yk)=(f(y1k), .. ,f(ynk))where f(yik) is equal to the 
rank of Yik divided by the number of observations). 
Thus, using the notation of Stark et al. (1986: 259), the Gini co-efficient can be written as: 
(2) 
where Skis the share of source k income in total village income (i.e. ~=µ.jµ), Gk the Gini 
co-efficient measuring the inequality in the distribution of income component k within the 
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village and Rk the 'Gini correlation' of income from source k with total income'1, defined 
as: 
R = _co_v[_Y._1cFi_(_Y)_] 
1c cov[Y1c,F(Y1c)l 
(3) 
Equation (2) states that the effect of source k income on total village inequality can be 
divided into three components: 
(a) the share of income component kin total village income (captured by the term Sic); 
(b) the inequality of income from source k within the villages (measured by GJ; and 
(c) the correlation between source k income and total income (as measured by Ric). 
The larger the product of these three components, the greater the contribution of income 
from source k to total income inequality. However, it must be noted that whilst Sic and Gk 
are always positive and less than one, Ric can fall anywhere on the interval [-1,l]. When Rk 
is less than one, income from source k is negatively correlated with total income and thus 
serves to lower the overall Gini measure for the village. 
Using this decomposition of the Gini co-efficient for total village income, it is possible to 
analyse how a change in the magnitude of village income from any particular source affects 
total income inequality within the village. 
Following Stark et al. (1986: 273-275), assume that there is an exogenous increase in income 
from source j by some factor qj· Thus, the distribution of income from source j becomes 
v; =((1 +q}Ytj,··,(1 +q)Ynj). Let G be the Gini co-efficient before the change in income and 
G( q} the Gini co-efficient after the change in income. Equation (2) gives the expression for 
G. However, in order to derive an expression for G( q} after a change in income from 
source j by factor (1 +0j), it is necessary to look at how the change affects each of Gk, Ric 
and Sk for k=l, .. ,K: 
31In essence, Rk is a form of rank correlation co-efficient as it measures the extent to which the relationship 
between Y k and the cumulative rank distribution of total income coincides with the relationship between Y k and 
its own cumulative rank distribution. 
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( a) Since we are dealing with a ( 1 + crj) times increase in y ij for i = 1, .. , n, Gj does not 
change. Obviously for all k¢j, Gk also remains unchanged. 
(b) Assuming that the change in income from source j is small enough to leave the 
ranking of total income unchanged, Ric, as a function of ranks of income, will remain 
unchanged. 
(b) Since Sk measures income component j's share in total income, Sk for k=l, .. ,K will 
obviously change if income from source j changes. Let us call each income 
component's new share in total income after the change in income component j, 
Sk(cr/ 
Thus, we can write the Gini co-efficient after the change in income component j as: 
By definition, for k¢j: 
while for income component j: 
K 
G(a) = L Sk(a) Rt Gk 
k=l 





L µk +aiµi 
k=l 
Thus, the change in the Gini co-efficient (~G) stemming from the exogenous change in 
income from source j can be written as: 
K 
AG= G(aj)-G = L [Sk(a)-Sk]RkGk 
k=l 
which simplifies to: 
Similarly, for k=j it can be shown that: 
2 a,~ -a J:. 
Sla~-S = r1 ri 





Substituting equations (5) and (6) into (4), a more detailed expression for ~G is obtained: 
K - a .~ _(! a ,~ 
AG = r rl!"J R G + rJ R G 
L.J l+aS. 1 1 l+a.~. '1 1 k=t , , r, 
(7) 
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In order to find the derivative of the Gini co-efficient with respect to uj, take the limit of 
equation (7) divided by uj as uj tends to zero: 
Hence, it can be shown that the derivative of the Gini co-efficient with respect to a change 
in income source j is: 
(8) 
If oG/ ouj is negative then a marginal increase in income component j will lessen income 
inequality. This will be the case when: 
income from component j has either a negative or zero correlation with total income 
(-1 <Rj <0); or 
income from source j is positively correlated with total income ~ > 0) and RjGj < G. 
Alternatively, in order for a marginal increase in source j income to worsen income 
inequality, it is necessary that Gj > G. (i.e. income from source j must be more unevenly 
distributed than total income). However, this condition alone is not sufficient for a change 
in income component j to worsen overall income distribution, as the sign of oG/oD'j will still 
be influenced by the strength of the Gini correlation between source j income and total 
income (Stark et al., 1986: 260). 
If equation (8) is divided through by G, it can be seen that: 
(9) 
Equation (9) states that the marginal percentage change in inequality (as measured by the 
Gini co-efficient) resulting from a small percentage change in income component j is equal 
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to component j's share in total inequality less component j's share in total income (Stark et 
al., 1986: 260). 
However, if one wants to examine how village welfare responds to changes in income from 
componentj, the sign of oG/ouj only tells part of the story. As Stark et al. (1986: 269) point 
out, an increase in source j income affects overall village welfare via two routes. Firstly, 
it raises average village income which generally has a positive effect on welfare, and 
secondly, it alters income distribution within the village (as measured by G) which has a 
positive or negative effect on welfare depending on whether income inequality has decreased 
or increased. To capture these two aspects of village welfare, Stark et al. make use of a 
village social welfare function of the form32: 
W= µ(1-G) (10) 
whereµ and G, as defined previously, are the village mean household income and the Gini 
measure of total income inequality respectively33• 
Assuming, as before, that there is an exogenous increase in income from source j by factor 
uj, then the sign of the change in welfare (as measured by equation (10)) can be evaluated 
by taking the derivative of W with respect to Oj· That is: 
(11) 
From the definition ofµ it can be shown that oµloOj=µj. Substituting this result and equation 
(8) into equation (11), it can be shown that: 
32Hereinafter, this social welfare function will be referred to as the 'Stark-Yitzhaki welfare index'. 
33Stark et al. (1986: 278) suggest that one can devise a more realistic social welfare function: 
w = µ(1-«G) 
where a is a 'behaviourial parameter' representing the welfare weighting of equity in the distribution of village 
income versus mean income. However, for simplicity's sake, for the purpose of calculation in this study (as 
in that of Stark et al.}, it has been assumed that a equals one. This simplifying assumption is legitimate as it 
is the sign of oW/ouj rather than the magnitude of W that is the objective of this analysis. 
which simplifies to: 
aw µ1 - = µ (1-G)-µ-(RG-G) 
60. 'J µ 'I I 
J 
aw - = µ.(1-R.G'\ aa J ] y 
I 
(12) 
A closer look at equation (12) reveals that oW/o~ is composed of two welfare effects: 
(a) A positive mean income effect; and 
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(b) A distribution effect, the sign of which depends on the sign of the Gini correlation 
of income from component j with total income (~). 
If Rj is negative, the distribution effect from an exogenous increase in component j reinforces 
the positive mean income effect (i.e. both effects act to increase village welfare). If~ is 
positive, the distribution effect acts in the opposite direction to the mean income effect. 
However, since both ~ and Gj can never exceed one, the distributional effect can never 
outweigh the mean income effect. Thus, even if Rj is positive, an increase in income from 
component j unambiguously increases total village welfare (Stark et al., 1986: 270). 
Dividing equation (12) through by W it can be shown that: 
•w 1 1-RG 
(-u )( .:.. ) = S 'I J 
l>a. W I 1-G 
J 
(13) 
This expression gives a measure of the marginal percentage change in welfare (as measured 
by the Stark-Yitzhaki welfare index) resulting from an exogenous small percentage change 
in income component j. As in the case of oG/ ouj, and for the same reasons, oW Io~ is always 
positive. 
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ii) Gini Measures of Village Income Inequality 
Gini co-efficients for the three villages, for both the distribution of income and cash receipts, 
calculated using equation (1), are shown in Table 21. In all three villages, the co-efficients 
are lower than the 0.55 for the distribution of income in South Africa as a whole. 
Gini Co-efficient for the Distribution of: 
Income Cash Receipts 
Rabula 0.371 0.339 
Bum shill 0.404 0.459 
Chatha 0.324 0.251 
Table 21: Distribution of Income and Cash 
Receipts Within the Villaa=es 
From Table 21 two important observations can be made: 
(a) Income inequality, as measured by the Gini co-efficient, varies across the three 
villages with Chatha having the most egalitarian distribution of income and Bumshill 
the most uneven. This 'ranking' of inequality across the three villages can be clearly 
seen in Figure 1 showing the Lorenz curves for the distribution of income in each 
village. 
None of the Lorenz curves intersect, with Rabula's Lorenz curve lying unequivocally 
between that of Bumshill (to its right) and Chatha (to its left). The very factors 
(superior education levels and location) that have enabled Bumshill (and to a lesser 
extent Rabula) to obtain relatively high levels of average household income, act as a 
major source of intra-village income inequality. As shown in Table 3, education is 
not evenly distributed within the villages and it is education which is the key to the 
skilled and semi-skilled jobs in the Ciskei civil service of which Rabula and Bumshill 
are geographically well situated to take advantage. Careers in teaching, nursing and 
agricultural extension require formal qualifications, whilst a matric (with no further 
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qualifications) opens up a number of clerical opportunities in the civil service. As 
seen previously, such jobs generally lead to higher remittances because, as well as 
being better paid than the more unskilled work of long term migrants, they enable the 
family member to maintain closer links with the rural base. Due to educational 
inequalities within the villages, not all households in Bumshill and Rabula have been 
able to access such jobs. Thus the creation of jobs via homeland government and 
decentralisation initiatives has lead to a certain degree of class distinction within the 
area34. 
34This is especially apparent in Bumshill where the older quitrent families, with their clear educational and 
property advantages, have achieved higher material living standards than families without title to land. These 
economic ('class') differences between the two groups add to the political ill-feeling that already exists between 
the quitrenters and landless families over access to residential sites on the commonage. 
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(b) In Rabula and Chatha, cash receipts are more evenly distributed within the villages 
than income, whilst in Burnshill the reverse is true (see Table 21). This provides 
evidence of the existence of different sources of income inequality across the three 
villages, and necessitates the breakdown of the Gini measure by source of inequality. 
iii) The Role of Migration in Village Income Inequality 
In order to evaluate the effect of labour migration on village income inequality, total village 
income is divided into three components: 
(a) remittances from short term commuters; 
(b) remittances from long term migrants; and 
(c) non-remittance income35• 
Using equation (3), Table 2236 shows the contribution of each of these sources of income 
to the Gini co-efficients of the three villages. The first column (S) shows that in each village 
non-remittance income constitutes between 50 and 60 per cent of total village income. 
However, the division of the remaining portion of village income between long term 
migrants' and short term commuters' remittances differs notably across the three villages, 
with Burnshill being heavily reliant on remittances from short term commuters and Chatha 
being largely dependent on the remittances of long term migrants. 
The second column (G) in Table 22 shows the Gini index for the inequality of each of the 
sources of income within the three villages. It can be seen that Burnshill and Rabula have 
notably higher Gini measures for non-remittance income than Chatha. This confirms the 
view that not only have the villages of Rabula and Burnshill enjoyed significant locational 
advantages over Chatha in the generation of income at the rural base, but also that access to 
these advantages has not been evenly distributed amongst households within the villages. 
3sThis category includes all income not in the first two categories and thus, necessarily contains remittances 
from members of separate households that cannot be classified as remittances from 'commuters' or 'migrants'. 
However, such amounts constitute an extremely small and insignificant portion of total income (see Table 18). 
Thus, non-remittance income is almost exclusively income generated or received within the Keiskammahoek 
district (for example, agricultural income, pensions, locally earned wages and salaries, etc.). 
36The breakdown of the Gini measures is presented in a similar format to that used by Stark et al. (1986). 
Contribution to the 
Share in Total Gini Co-efficient Gini Correlation Gini Co-efficient of Percentage Share 
Household for Income Source with Total Income Total Income in Gini of Total 
Village and Income Source Income (S) (G) Rankings (R) (SGR) Income 
RABULA 
Non-Remittance Income • 0.568 0.510 0.782 0.227 61.0% 
Short Term Commuters' Remittances 0.240 0.709 0.692 0.118 31.7% 
Long Term Migrants' Remittances 0.193 0.614 0.225 0.027 7.3% 
Total Income 1.001 0.371 1.000 0.372 100.0% 
BURNSHILL 
Non-Remittance Income • 0.589 0.583 0.638 0.219 54.2% 
Short Term Commuters' Remittances 0.323 0.747 0.686 0.166 41.1% 
Long Term Migrants' Remittances 0.088 0.809 0.270 0.019 4.7% 
Total Income 1.000 0.404 1.000 0.404 100.0% 
CHATHA 
Non-Remittance Income• 0.545 0.307 0.678 0.113 35.1% 
Short Term Commuters' Remittances 0.118 0.892 0.659 0.069 21.4% 
Long Term Migrants' Remittances 0.336 0.591 0.707 0.140 43.5% 
Total Income 0.999 0.324 1.000 0.322 100.0% 
Table 22: Decomposition of Gini Co-efficients 
[•'Non-Remittance Income' includes all income that is not from short term commuters' and long term migrants' remittances.] 
°' °' 
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Indeed, the ranking of the villages in terms of inequality of non-remittance income mirrors 
their ranking in terms of total income inequality (Bumshill being the most uneven and Chatha 
the most even). 
Chatha's more egalitarian distribution of non-remittance income is largely due to the relative 
importance of Ciskei government pensions in total village income. Unlike other sources of 
income, these pensions are not linked to social stratifying factors such as education and 
wealth, and thus are generally more evenly distributed within the village than other 
components of income37 • In Bumshill and Rabula, the relative equality of access to 
pensions across the village is largely 'cancelled out' by more unevenly distributed income 
components that are larger in size relative to pensions than in the case of Chatha. 
Looking at the third column in Table 22 (R), it can be seen that in Rabula and Bumshill, 
non-remittance income and remittances from short term commuters have relatively high Gini 
correlations with total income (over 0.6 in each case) whilst remittances from long term 
migrants have less than half the degree of correlation (below 0.3). This suggests that the 
families in Rabula and Bumshill with the highest income levels are generally not dependent 
on long term migrants for significant portions of income. On the other hand, in Chatha, all 
three sources of income enjoy a relatively high measure of Gini correlation with total income 
(above 0.6). 
The last column in Table 22 shows that in Rabula and Bumshill, non-remittance income 
'contributes' over half, and short term migrants' remittances over 30 per cent, of the Gini 
co-efficient for the distribution of total income. In both villages long term migrants' 
remittances, due to their low shares in total income (low S values) contribute less than 10 per 
cent to the overall measure ( despite this income component having a high Gini measure 
itself). In Chatha, contributions to the total Gini co-efficient are more evenly spread across 
37In as much as life expectancy is skewed by wealth and education levels within villages, it could be argued 
that there is not equal access to old-age pensions within a village. However, such a bias within any village is 
likely to be extremely small and old-age pensions, in general, appear to be the most egalitarian component of 
income. 
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the three components of income, ranging from 21.4 per cent in the case of short term 
commuters' remittances to 43.5 per cent in the case of remittances from long term migrants. 
The large share of non-remittance income and short term commuters' remittances in total 
income inequality in Rabula and Bumshill means that it is the factors causing the inequality 
in these two components that are responsible for the more skewed overall income distribution 
in Rabula and Bumshill than in Chatha. As has been mentioned before, the skewed 
education levels within Bumshill and Rabula (and the resultant skewed access to spatially-
related opportunities) appears to explain the skewed distribution of these two income 
components, and hence overall income, in these two villages. Chatha, on the other hand, 
without the educational and geographic advantages of the other two villages, 'by default' has 
a more even income distribution. Thus, it appears that at a microeconomic level, a type of 
Kuznets' 'inverted U' relationship exists, with the three villages studied currently falling on 
the upward sloping section of the 'inverted U' (i.e. as average household income levels rise 
as we move from Chatha, the least developed village, to Bumshill, the most developed, 
income distribution becomes more skewed). 
iv) The Link between Migration and Rural Income Distribution 
Assessing the exact effect of migration on village income inequality is a complex task. Stark 
et al. (1986) believe that the impact of migration on village income distribution changes over 
time. They suggest that initially it is only the best educated that migrate from the rural base 
and thus, at the outset of migration, village income distribution is skewed by migration. 
However, over time, as education levels within the village rise and migration networks are 
established, migration becomes open to increasing numbers of village residents. Thus, they 
argue, at some point in a village's migration history, migration starts to play an equalising 
role in village income distribution. 
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The evidence from these three villages supports this view. Income distribution in Rabula and 
Bumshill, with higher levels of education, economic development and migration38 than 
Chatha, is equalised by migration. Evidence of this is found in the second column (G) of 
Table 22, which shows that the Gini indices of 0.510 and 0.583 for the distribution of non-
remittance income in Rabula and Burnshill respectively, are lowered to overall levels of 
0.271 and 0.404 respectively after the inclusion of migration (both long term and short term) 
in the calculation. In Chatha, the reverse situation is found with the Gini measure of 0.307 
for the distribution of non-remittance income being raised to 0.324 by the incorporation of 
both types of migration in the calculation. Thus, in terms of Stark et al. 's analysis, as 
education levels improve in Chatha one would expect migration to have a more equilibrating 
effect on village income distribution. 
v) The Effect of Changes in the Magnitude of Components of Village Income on Distribution 
and Village Welfare Levels 
The fact that migration in general, currently plays an equalising role in income inequality in 
Rabula and Bumshill and an opposite role in Chatha, in no way explains how village income 
inequality will respond to changes in the magnitude of different components of income. To 
see this it is necessary to look at Table 23, showing the response of the Gini co-efficients in 
the three villages to exogenous proportionate changes in the different income components. 
Table 23 shows that in each village an exogenous proportionate increase in short term 
commuters' remittances will worsen village income distribution (in each case, oG/ ou2 > 0). 
This would appear to be due to the already mentioned fact that most short term commuters' 
jobs require education which is generally fairly unevenly distributed within the villages and 
it is only the best educated that are able to become short term commuters. In other words, 
if the income, and consequently the remittances, of these commuters were to rise, with all 
else remaining equal, one would expect overall income distribution to become more skewed. 
38Houghton and Walton (1952) point out that in 1949, due to local employment opportunities (and 
presumably its isolated location), Chatha had relatively low levels of migration compared to Rahula and 
Bumshill. This suggests that in fact, Rahula and Bumshill, have enjoyed a 'head-start' in migration over 
Chatha. 
59 
The Effects of an Exogenous uj Change 
in Income Component j on Overall 
Village Income Inequality. 
The Derivative of The Marginal 
the Village Gini Percentage Change 
Co-efficient*. in the Village Gini 
t,G/ouj Co-efficient. 
Village and Income Source 
(oG/ouillG) 
[Equation (8)] [Equation (9)] 
RAB ULA 
Non-Remittance Income (u1) 0.016 0.043 
Short Term Commuters' Remittances (u2) 0.029 0.077 
Long Term Migrants' Remittances ( u3) -0.045 -0.121 
BURNS HILL 
Non-Remittance Income (u1) -0.019 -0.047 
Short Term Commuters' Remittances (ui) 0.035 0.087 
Long Term Migrants' Remittances (u3) -0.016 -0.040 
CHATHA 
Non-Remittance Income (u1) -0.063 -0.195 
Short Term Commuters' Remittances (ui) 0.031 0.096 
Long Term Migrants' Remittances (u3) 0.032 0.097 
Table 23: Sensitivity of the Villa&e Gini Co-efficient 
[ • The derivatives are calculated for a ceteris parabus change in income component j. 
They do not show the effect of a re-allocation of labour amongst income components.] 
This finding has important ramifications for the restructuring of the homelands. If these 
villages are indeed representative of the Ciskei, any policy changes that decrease civil service 
size or wages (such as changes to the homeland system) and consequently decreased short 
term commuters' remittances, would decrease rural inequality. Thus, these results suggest 
that the homeland system, along with decentralisation, by increasing the income-earning 
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opportunities for skilled and semi-skilled people within short term commuting distance of the 
rural base, has worsened rural income distribution. 
In both Rabula and Bumshill, income distribution would be improved by increases in 
remittances from long term migrants (oG/ou3 <0). This is due to the low Gini correlation 
of this component of income with total income. However, in Chatha, where the Gini 
correlation of long term migrants' remittances with total income is much higher and these 
remittances contribute a greater share of the total Gini measure than in the other two villages, 
an increase in remittances from long term migrants will worsen overall income distribution 
( oG/ ou3 > 0). The ambiguity in the sign of oG/ ou3 across the three villages has an important 
implication for policy analysis. Any policy or wage bargaining that increases the wages of 
unskilled workers in urban areas, within whose ranks there are considerable numbers of long 
term migrants from rural areas, could worsen (as in the case of Chatha) or improve rural 
income distribution (as in the case of Bumshill and Rabula), depending on the Gini 
correlation of remittances from these workers with overall rural income distribution. 
, 
However, in order to make a fuller assessment of possible policy implications it is 
insufficient to merely consider the distributional effects of changes in components of income. 
Consideration also has to be given to welfare effects of potential policy. From a national 
perspective this is a difficult matter because, as Harris and Todaro (1970), Stiglitz (1974), 
Corden and Findlay (1975) and Cole and Sanders (1985) point out, all policy, rural and 
urban, has implications for both the urban and rural welfare. Indeed, policy often has 
contradictory welfare effects for urban and rural areas, which have to be netted off against 
each other to arrive at the overall welfare effect of a policy for the economy as a whole. 
This is particularly the case regarding policy aimed at influencing migration, with its obvious 
effects on both rural and urban areas. 
No consensus in the literature appears to have been reached as to the overall national welfare 
effects of migration. Whilst it is fairly unanimously held that migration improves rural 
welfare, authors differ as to the national welfare effects. Without considering the 
distributional effect on rural income of migration, Harris and Todaro (1970), in a two-sector 
Village and Income Source 
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Table 24: Sensitivity of Villa&e Welfare Levels 
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analysis of migration, argue that whilst possibly reducing national welfare, migration 
unambiguously enhances rural welfare. Cole and Sanders (1985), in a similar analysis, 
taking into account different skill levels of migrants, contend that as migrants tend to be 
more productive in their jobs away from the rural base than they would be at the rural base, 
migration indeed improves overall national welfare. 
This study, just like that of Stark et al. (1986), whilst not directly focused on the national 
welfare implications of migration, provides evidence in support of the theoretical result of 
both Harris and Todaro (1970) and Cole and Sanders (1985) that migration categorically 
increases rural welfare. Indeed, it has already been shown in the theoretical discussion of 
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the Stark-Yitzhaki welfare index, that an exogenous increase in any of the components of 
rural income has a positive effect on rural welfare. 
Table 24 shows the percentage changes in rural village welfare39 caused by a one per cent 
change in each income component. From this table, it can be seen that whilst an increase 
in any income component would have a positive effect on welfare40, a one per cent increase 
· in non-remittance income would produce a larger increase in welfare than a one per cent 
increase in either one of the other two income components. Whilst this result is largely due 
to the fact that non-remittance income is a large component of total village income in each 
village, it stresses the importance of providing income-earning opportunities in the rural areas 
in order to increase rural welfare. However, as in any policy formulation, policy-makers 
must bear in mind the costs of policy aimed at increasing different components of rural 
income41 • 
Table 24 also serves as a warning for the restructuring of the homelands and current 
decentralisation incentives, no matter how economically inefficient they are. Harris and 
Todaro (1970), in their two sector analysis of migration, showed that whilst increasing 
.... 
national welfare, restricting migration will unambiguously decrease rural welfare. Thus, any 
re-incorporation of the homelands into South Africa that placed limits on migration (for 
example, by decreasing the opportunities for short term commuting) would harm village 
welfare. 
This study supports this view. It was argued above that a decrease in skilled and semi-skilled 
job opportunities in the homelands and surrounding centres, caused, for example, by the 
restructuring of decentralisation policy and the homelands, by reducing the remittances from 
short term commuters, would improve rural village income distribution. However, such a 
decrease would reduce overall rural village welfare as the attendant negative 'mean income' 
39As measured by the Stark-Yitzhaki welfare index described by equation (10) (Stark et al., 1986: 269). 
40 As demonstrated in the theoretical discussion above. 
41In practice this welfare analysis is far too simplistic. In reality, policy changes relative prices facing rural 
households and in so doing alters overall family behaviour, thereby rendering partial derivative analysis of G 
and W, with respect to changes in DJ, impossible. 
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welfare effect would outweigh the positive 'distribution' welfare effect. Thus, if the 
homelands are to be re-incorporated into greater South Africa, careful attention has to be paid 
to the existing homeland bureaucracies. 
Currently, the homelands and decentralisation policy, however inefficient, constitutes an 
important redistributive mechanism within South Africa. Streamlining these bureaucracies 
and cutting inefficient decentralisation incentives, without adequate compensating regional 
policy, would undoubtedly have negative welfare implications for rural Ciskei villages. This 
danger of reducing already low rural welfare levels, seen against the backdrop of current 
political dissatisfaction within the homelands and the high population levels in these areas, 
serves to underline the importance of regional policy in a future South Africa. 
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CHAPTERS 
ON-GOING TEMPORARY (OSCILLATING) MIGRATION 
Contrary to the predictions of radical writers that temporary migration42 would be replaced 
by permanent out-migration upon the ending of influx control, this thesis presents evidence 
of the importance of on-going temporary migration. Whilst migrants' destinations, jobs, and 
the frequency of their visits home have, in many instances, changed since the earlier 
Keiskammahoek study (Houghton and Walton, 1952), the system of temporary migration has 
remained largely intact. 
In saying this, one is not denying the existence (and importance) of permanent emigration 
from the area, but rather noting that the extent of on-going temporary migration appears to 
be in conflict with the experience of urban transition in the developed world. 
Mabin (1990) points out that this is indeed a phenomenon found throughout the developing 
world. 
Based on the history of developed economies, one would expect South Africa, given its 
current stage of development, to have a higher degree of urbanisation than it has. South 
Africa has exhibited slower rates of permanent urbanisation than conventional urban 
transition models predict for a country with South Africa's level of economic development. 
South Africa is still relatively under-urbanised compared to countries with similar economic 
structures and levels of per-capita income. It has been estimated that in 1985 approximately 
53 per cent43 of South Africa's Black population was effectively urbanised (Urban 
Foundation, 1990), compared to the average 1980 urbanisation level of 63 per cent for the 
so-called 'upper middle-income economies' that South Africa is classified with by the World 
Bank (Development Bank of Southern Africa, 1987: 7). 
42Tbe broad label 'temporary migrants' is used here to cover both 'long term migrants' and 'short term 
commuters', who ultimately return or intend to return to the rural base (even if only at the end of their working 
lives). 
43This urbanisation measure includes all residents of dense settlements that are 'functionally urban', where-
ever they are located within South Africa. 
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Thus, given the existence of forces (such as agglomeration economies in urban areas and 
structural under-employment in rural areas) driving South Africa to ultimately higher levels 
of urbanisation, it is necessary to examine the factors currently retarding permanent 
emigration from rural areas. These factors clearly extend far beyond historical institutional 
barriers to urbanisation due to Apartheid. Mabin (1990) suggests that it is necessary to 
revise traditional models of urban transition in order to explain persistent temporary 
migration. This task has to be tackled at the household level, and based on the results of this 
survey presented in this chapter a number of factors contributing to the persistence of 
temporary migration can be isolated. 
5.1. Risk and the Rural Family 
The economic environment in which rural families exist is subject to a high degree of 
uncertainty, a considerable component stemming from rural households' involvement in 
agricultural activity. As Deaton (1991: 1) points out: 
Agricultural income is inherently uncertain·. Weather, pests, disease and fire 
make yields uncertain, and the variability of agricultural prices can generate 
fluctuations in farmers' incomes even when output is stable. 
This uncertainty adds to the problem of low household agricultural incomes stemming from 
poor agricultural production in the homelands, which, as Simkins (1981: 262) points out, has 
been declining since the early 1950's. 
However, instability of agricultural incomes is by no means the only source of income 
variability in the rural areas. As has been shown earlier, unemployment in rural areas tends 
to be high (especially at the lowest skill levels), leading to significant risk being associated 
with wage employment in the rural areas. This adds to the potential variability of rural 
incomes. 
This variability in income poses a serious problem for rural households. Becker (1965 and 
1988) suggests that rural households do not necessarily act purely so as to maximise expected 
income, but rather to maximise potential utility. Thus, households are as concerned with the 
timing and source of future income streams, as with their discounted present value. 
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However, rural households, constrained by poor education levels and low income levels, 
generally have limited access to commercial schemes devised to deal with uncertainty (for 
example, insurance policies) and are consequently forced to make use of alternative risk-
management· strategies. 
As Guillet (1982) and Deaton (1991) point out, rural households, like any other economic 
units, respond to uncertainty by attempting to diversify and shed risk. Deaton (1991), 
focusing on agricultural uncertainty, discusses a variety of ways in which households can 
'provide insurance' for their own consumption by consuming on the basis of their permanent, 
rather than their actual, incomes and: 
sharing among individuals who are sufficiently well known to each other, so 
that moral hazard is weak enough to permit substantial pooling of risk. 
(Deaton, 1991: 1-2). 
Guillet (1982: 9-12) cites a number of rural household risk-reducing strategies, that can be 
divided into two broad categories. Firstly, Guillet points out that households respond to risk 
by adopting 'mixed' agricultural strategies. Amongst other risk-avoidance tactics, 
households diversify their crops, make use of 'inter-cropping' and adopt a mixed agro-
pastoral strategy. Secondly, Guillet suggests that in response to risk, rural families attempt 
to achieve a diversified combination of productive activities within the household, a strategy 
which he describes by the term "polyvalency" (Guillet, 1982: 12) .. Temporary migration is 
an important component of this strategy. 
In this light, the spatially diverse household, linked by a system of oscillating migration, 
can be viewed as a rational, welfare-maximizing household strategy to deal with financial 
risk44• The placing of family members in spatially and sectorally diverse urban jobs 
achieves a diversified household income portfolio. The agricultural activity at the rural base 
is just a 'cheap' component of this diversified portfolio (cheap in the sense that it has low 
associated opportunity costs). A family's stockholding at the rural base provides a form of 
44In terming a household 'rational', it is simply assumed that the household acts in what it perceives as its 
own· interest, given its educational and cultural background. 
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saving that can be drawn upon in bad times. Indeed, Table 11 provides evidence of Chatha 
households making such 'stock withdrawals' over the survey period. 
Thus, the maintenance of a rural base (and consequently temporary migration) is likely to 
continue to be an important component of rural households' risk-management strategy until 
families start utilising commercial risk-spreading and savings mechanisms. Access to such 
mechanisms is dependent on both education and income levels. As has been seen in Tables 
10, 12 and 13, the level of rural household incomes is notably dependent on remittances, and 
consequently, on urban incomes. Thus it appears that a rise in urban wages large enough 
to allow households access to risk-management strategies adequate for the entire family is 
a necessary condition for any shift to permanent emigration from rural areas. 
5.2. The Rural Base as Security for Retirement 
Insurance against fluctuations in the urban labour market is not the only form of security that 
the rural base provides. Being able to return to the rural base upon retirement, constitutes 
an important source of security for a migrant in his or her old-age. The migrant knows that 
he or she will be relatively well cared for by the next generation of the family. As has been 
mentioned previously, Lucas and Stark (1985) suggest that migrants' remittances can in some 
ways be likened to contributions towards their 'retirement fund'. 
Few migrants have jobs with pensions large enough to enable them to maintain the same 
standard of living after retirement in the urban area as they can achieve by retiring to the 
rural base. Evidence of the low levels of private, 'work' pensions can be seen in Table 10. 
In each village this component of income constitutes only a small share of total village 
income. 
For there to be any significant move towards permanent migration from rural areas, migrant 
workers would require wages or salaries high enough to allow them to contribute to pension 
schemes that would enable them to retire to the same perceived standard of living in the 
urban area as they can currently retire to in the rural area. The issue of pension schemes is 
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an area that requires future research and is likely to be a key determinant of demographic 
trends in a future South Africa. 
5.3 Land Tenure 
Current land tenure arrangements play an important role in explaining the slower than 
expected rate of permanent emigration from the rural areas. Three main categories of land 
tenure (trust, quitrent and freehold tenure) are represented in the sample studied, each with 
its attendant barrier to economically efficient permanent out-migration from rural areas. 
A family that has access to a trust field possesses an asset that it cannot convert into cash. 
Trust title cannot be traded. If the family was to move to town on a permanent basis, it 
would have to relinquish its land. Even if a field is under-utilized, it provides a family with 
a potential means of income during hard times. This security cannot be costlessly replicated 
in an urban area. 
Access to a field also provides considerable social and psychological benefit to household 
members. A temporary migrant finding him- or herself unemployed can return to the rural 
base and work on the family field (even if the worker is under-employed doing so). Thus, 
he or she avoids some of the loss of self-worth associated with 'sitting idle' when not 
employed. Being unemployed in the rural area is thus not only less costly than being 
unemployed in the urban area, but also psychologically preferable. Not only is there some 
work to do, but also the close cultural links between families in a rural village provide a 
form of security to an unemployed person unattainable in an urban environment. 
Until a trust family can convert the full value of their field into cash, they will perceive this 
value as a cost of permanent migration. Thus, if one considers the Todaro (1969) approach 
to migration, the 'critical' level of expected urban income that will induce a family to 
migrate would be increased by this value. Hence, trust tenure provides a significant barrier 
to the mobility of households. 
69 
If tradeable title to land is all that is required to prompt permanent migration, the question 
arises as to why temporary migration is still so prevalent amongst freehold and quitrent 
families. This question can only be answered in light of the serious imperfections in the 
market for such land. 
Despite the fact that freehold and quitrent title can be transferred by sale, various social and 
cultural factors restrict the freedom with which land is sold. The village authorities, whether 
they are the headmen or the residents' committees, are generally perceived as having some 
say over who moves into an area. Whilst these authorities cannot actually prevent sales, 
their sanction of newcomers is culturally important. It is generally perceived that the village 
authorities should look after their community to a certain degree, and thus newcomers should 
be approved by the authority45 • Any sanction over the sale of land, be it real or perceived, 
pushes down the price of land and limits the volume of land traded. Consequently, freehold 
and quitrent landholders cannot currently convert their land into an equivalent urban asset. 
The barrier to permanent migration constituted by an absence of free-functioning rural land 
market was pointed out by Elkan (1959: 195) who, in a study of migration in Kenya, pointed 
out that: 
if the future income of a farm, however small, cannot be capitalised, the farm 
must exercise a strong pull. So long as a man cannot obtain compensation for 
vacating his land . . . he has no inducement to vacate it. 
Thus, freehold title and an active market in land (free of social restrictions) appear to be 
necessary conditions for any move towards permanent migration. 
Despite such market imperfections, De Wet et al. (1992) has found evidence of limited sale 
of freehold land in Rabula which would tend to suggest the potential for a more active rural 
land market in the event of the elimination of the aforementioned market inefficiencies. 
This call for freehold title is independent of any of the purported direct agricultural benefits 
of freehold title. Development theorists often suggest that freehold land tenure places the 
landholder in a favourable position for securing loans and thus modernizing the farming 
45Sales between parties from within the same village are not subject to such social censure. 
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operation. However, the small size of the majority of freehold plots, and their being 
scattered between commonage and trust land, prevent them from constituting practical 
security for loans. In this study, no significant difference has been found between the 
agricultural performance of freeholders and trust farmers, and thus the suggestion of freehold 
title above is put forward purely for the purpose of increasing population mobility46• 
Economic theory suggests that in the event of converting title to freehold, the first families 
to sell and permanently migrate would be the least efficient farmers and those least interested 
in small scale agriculture. These families' plots are most likely to be bought by the more 
efficient farmers who could then start to reap economies of scale. Despite agricultural 
performance being poor across all the different categories of landholders, there were a few 
notable exceptions in each category that produced promising results, and constitute the most 
likely early buyers in a 'fleqgling' land market. However, for this to happen there would 
have to be a concurrent weakening in the cultural preference to hold agricultural land, even 
when one does not intend to use it. 
5.4. Urban and Rural Housing 
Rural households are further discouraged from permanent emigration from rural areas by: 
a shortage of urban housing and sites ( coupled with 'harsh' urban building regulations 
relative to the unregulated rural areas) pushing up the price of urban housing relative 
to rural housing; and 
relatively imperfect markets for rural housing compared with urban housing further 
widening this price differential. 
Thus, the amount a rural household is likely to receive by selling its home is likely to fall 
well short of the price of an equivalent urban home. This means that a rural family 
permanently migrating to an urban area will either require a bond or have to rent 
accommodation. Both options constitute significant barriers to permanent migration. Taking 
46It must be noted that De Wet and Leibbrandt (forthcoming) found that, in general, trust farmers out-
perform freeholders in terms of maize yield. However, due to the small scale of the farming operations by both 
categories of landholder, this difference in yield results in very little absolute divergence in their agricultural 
production (see Appendix D). 
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out a bond requires a family to have access to sufficient income over a long period of time. 
This is only likely in the case of families with well-educated members with relatively skilled 
jobs who are currently the least likely to migrate permanently due to their success in 
accessing economic opportunities close to the rural base. 
Thus, more efficient rural housing markets and a greater supply of affordable urban housing 
are obvious facilitating factors for a switch from systems of temporary migration to 
permanent emigration. 
It must be noted that none of the changes in pensions, land tenure and housing markets 
outlined above are, on their own, sufficient to facilitate a shift towards permanent migration. 
They simply constitute necessary conditions for such a shift. 
S.S. Concluding Comments and the Direction of Future Research 
This thesis has attempted to provide an insight into the measurement, adequacy, sources and 
distribution of rural incomes in the three Keiskammahoek villages studied. In so doing, it 
has been shown that whilst enhancing rural welfare, different forms of migration can have 
different distributional effects in rural areas depending on the education and migration history 
of the village concerned. This, it has been argued, has an important message for policy-
makers in the way it highlights the importance of the current homeland and decentralisation 
system (however much the political disapproval) in rural welfare. 
Furthermore, the likelihood of continued temporary migration has been demonstrated, thereby 
providing empirical support for Bell's (1972) theoretical conclusion and Mabin's (1990) 
suggestion that even in the absence of Apartheid laws, it is possible that temporary migration 
will persist in South Africa in the long run. 
The analysis in this dissertation has concentrated on the rural end of the spatially extended 
rural household. However, migrants' behaviour is influenced by 'both the urban and rural 
sides of the migration equation'. Thus, there is a limit to the conclusions that can be drawn 
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from such a study without more detailed information on the urban living conditions and 
arrangements of migrants. 
Consequently, there is a need for future research that captures both the rural and urban ends 
of the same sample to essentially 'close the migration model'. However, such data cannot 
be obtained from a rural survey alone and the logistical requirements of chasing up the urban 
end of a rural sample (or vice versa) are immense. Rural household members, whilst by and 
large being able to accurately supply information on migrants' remittances to the rural base, 
are generally not in a position to supply sufficient information on migrants' work to arrive 
at sufficiently accurate proxies for migrants' urban wages. Indeed, migrants often actively 
shield this level of information from rural household members to prevent them from being 
in a position to make value judgements as to the adequacy of migrants' remittances relative 
to their total salary. This lack of data prevents valuable modelling of remittance behaviour 
in the manner of Lucas and Stark (1990). 
What has become clear from the survey is the extent to which the villages differed in sources 
of income and access to employment. Burnshill provides an example of a village that, in 
support of the view of Graaff (1987), can be regarded as functionally urbanised, in terms of 
both household activities and aspirations. The error of regarding Burnshill families as 
peripheral agricultural units has been amply demonstrated by the aforementioned difficulties 
experienced by the irrigation schemes. Chatha, on the other hand, continues to conform 
more closely to the 'stereotype' of a poor rural village dependent on long term migrants, with 
Rabula falling somewhere between these two polar extremes, showing characteristics of both. 
Thus, policy-makers must be sensitive to the problem of broadly assuming that rural 
households are generally homogeneous and consequently respond to similar signals. The 
apparent success of the best educated households in all the villages confirms the value of non-
specific human capital in the rural context, and provides a signpost for the way forward in 
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Detailed Household Questionnaire 
CONFIDENTIAL 
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Date of interview -----------------------
Type of land access ----------------------





Household head's name - Xhosa ---------------English ______________ _ 
Xhosa ---------------Respondent's first name - English ______________ _ 
(4) Number of people in the household at present ------------
(5) Number of people currently living at home -------------
(6) Number of people away from the rural base ------------
(whether working, studying or unemployed) 
Page 1 of 13. 
SECTION B - HOUSEHOLD LABOUR INFORMATION 
(1) Household demographic and education data. 
Is the Person 
. Currently 
Relationship Busy with How was 
with Spouse's their Highest Tertiary 
Household Mother's Name Education? Standard Post-School Education 
Individual Age Sex Head Name (if married) Place of Birth (yes/no) Reached Training Financed? 
~ 
Page 2 of 13. 
(2) Details of all persons not currently busy with their education (and those still busy with their education living away from the rural base). 
Place of Place of Employer's Employer's Salary I When last at Length of Average No. of 
Individual Occupation Employment Residence Name Main Activity Income Home the Visit Visits Per Year 
(3) Cash remittances over the preceding 12 months. 
Individual Oct 89 Nov 89 Dec 89 Jan 90 Feb 90 Mar90 Apr90 May 90 Jun 90 Jul 90 Aug90 Sep 90 
gg 
Page 3 of 13. 
(4) Remittances in the form of goods (particularly groceries) over the last 12 months. 
Individual Oct 89 Nov 89 Dec 89 Jan 90 Feb 90 Mar90 Apr 90 May 90 Jun 90 Jul 90 
(5) Remittances in the form of account I hire purchase payments over the last 12 months. 
Total Amount of Payments over Period Over which Payments were 
Individual Type of Goods Purchased the Year Made & How Often within the Period 
Page 4 of 13. 
Aug90 Sep 90 
Paid to ... 
00 -
(6) Household Members that have permanently migrated from the rural base within the last 10 years. 
Year of Married at Time When Were they 
Individual Education Level Migration of Migrating? Married Now? Married? 
Place of Employer's Employer's Main When Were They 
Individual Residence Salary I Income Name Activity Last at Home? 
Page 5 of 13. 
Occupation 




Average No. of 
Visits Per Year 
00 
N 
SECTION C - HOUSEHOLD LAND-HOLDING 
(1) Household's access to land. 
Piece 
Type of Land Number Type of Access (Title) 
1 





(Within the Homestead) 
3 
1 







If Land is Rented ... 
From Whom? Amount of the Rental? 




(2) Did you rent out or lend out any of your land this season, during the 1989/90 season 
or during the 1988/89 season? -------------------
To Whom? 
Season Plot Siz.e (Relationship to head) Rent or Lend? Rental? 
(3.1) Did you plant or plough your garden or arable land in either of the seasons: 
1988/89 1989/90 
(3.1.1) Garden? 
(3.1.2) Arable Land? 
(3.2) If answer to either (3.1.1) or (3.1.2) was "no", why not? 
(3.3) If answer to either (3.1.1) or (3.1.2) was "yes", then what area was planted? 
1988/89 1989/90 
(3.1.1) Garden? 
(3.1.2) Arable Land? 
(3.4) If the whole area of either the garden or arable land was not planted, why not? 
(4) Is there a fence around your garden? -----------------
(5) Is the arable land fenced off from the grazing land? -----------
(6) Is your land irrigated? ---------------------
If so, give details of type of irrigation: ----------------
Page 7 of 13. 
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SECTION D - ASSET HOLDING AND USAGE 
(1.1) Does the household own any vehicles (car, bakkie, truck, mini-bus, tractor, etc.)? 
Vehicle type: Owner: ________ _ 
Owner: -------------------
(1.2) Are any of the vehicles used for commercial purposes? 
If "yes", give the following details: 
Vehicle Rented to whom? How Often do You Rent it Out? Rental 
(2) Inventory of the household's larger furniture items. 
Item Quantity Paid for by? Item Quantity Paid for by? II 
Generator Kitchen Unit 
Television Coal Stove 
Lounge Suite Other (specify): 
Dining Room Suite 
Bedroom Suite 
(3 .1) Inventory of household's ·equipment. 
Item Quantity Paid for by? Item Quantity Paid for by? 
Plough Shovel 
Hoeing Plough Spade 
Disc Planter Fork 
Spike Harrow Rake 
Cart I Wagon Hand-hoe 
Sledge Pick 
Water Tank Axe 
Grain Tank Other (specify): 
Wheelbarrow 
Page 8 of 13. 
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(3.2) Do you use any of your equipment for commercial purposes? --------
If "yes", give the following details: 
Equipment Rented to whom? How Often do You Rent it Out? Rental 
(4) Do you rent equipment or machinery (or any other large items) from anybody? 
(includeborrowedequipmenthere) -----------------
If "yes", give the following details: 
Rented From Annual Rental 




SECTION E- HEALTH AND LIVING STANDARDS 
( 1.1) What is your source of: 
(1.1. l)DrinkingWater? _________________ _ 
(1.l.2)WaterforOtherPurposes? --------------
(1.2) If you use a water tank(s), for how many months of the year can you rely on it 
(them)? 
(1.3) Apart from your tank(s), what is your nearest source of water? --------
(1.4) Approximate distance? --------------------
(1.5) How do you fetch the water? -------------------
(1.6) Approximate time taken to fetch water (there & back)? ----------
(2) What energy source do you use for: Cooking? __________ _ 
Lighting?-----------
(3) Give details of household toilet facilities.---------------
Page 9 of 13. 
SECTION F - CROP DETAILS 
1988/89 Season 
Planted Yield (off Month Month Area of Land 










(Remember that more than one type of crop can be grown in a field.) 
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Planted Yield (off 









SECTION G - CROP SALES 
(1.1) Did you sell any of your crop production from: 
(1.1.1)1988/89? ________________ _ 
(1.1.2)1989/90? ________________ _ 
(1.2) If "no" to either of the above, why not? ---------------
(1.3) If "yes", then give details: 
Type of Crop 
Sales Volume and Value 
Where To When 
Sold 
Quantity Sold At Price? 
Sold? Whom? Sold? 
1988/89 
1989/90 
(3) What do you do with crops that you do not sell (eat them yourself, feed to the 
animals, give away, etc.)? --------------------
Page 11 of 13. 
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( 4) Give details of the following expenses related to agriculture: 
1988/89 1989/90 
(4.1) Labour Employed 
( 4.2) Irrigation 
(4.3) Seed 
(4.4) Manure I Fertiliser 
(4.5) Fencing 
(4.6) Dipping 
(4. 7) Sheep-shearing 
(4.8) Transport of Produce I 
Stock 
(4.9) Veterinary Services 
(4.10) Other (please specify): 
(Note: Give details to enable the quantification of any agricultural expenditure on any of the 
above items that was paid in-kind.) 
Page 12 of 13. 




Oxen Bulls Heifers Tollies Horses Sheep · Goats Pigs Chickens (specify) 
Number of stock now 
Stock at the same time last year 
Reasons for the change in stock 
(births, deaths, slaughter, buying 
or selling) 
Uses of your stock (milk, eggs, 
hides, draught, transport) 
Livestock I value of produce 
exchanged for stock in the last 
12 months 
Where sold & to whom? 
Why sold? 
Quantity sold or exchanged 
Income I value of goods 
received 
~ 
Page 13 of 13. 
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APPENDIX B 
MAP OF THE KEIS~OEK DISTRICT IN RELATION TO THE CISKEI 
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A BRIEF LAND TENURE HISTORY OF THE RESEARCH AREA47 
The Ciskei today is occupied by Xhosa and Mfengu people, both groups having descendants 
in all three of the villages surveyed (the Mfengu people being the predominant group, 
particularly in Upper Rabula and Burnshill). Manona (1981) points out that Xhosa people 
have lived in both the Ciskei and the Transkei since, at the latest, the middle of the 1500's. 
The Mfengu arrived in the area that today is the Ciskei around the 1830's, fleeing from the 
chaos of Chaka's wars in Natal. 
For political purposes, the Mfengu aligned themselves with the British colonial government, 
assisting the British defeat the Xhosas in the various frontier wars fought during the 
nineteenth century. For their support, the colonial government granted the Mfengu large 
tracts of freehold land that previously belonged to the Xhosa (the Xhosa having been expelled 
during the course of the frontier wars). 
Manona (1981) notes that the Mfengu had a close, early association with Christianity, leading 
to a strong mission school tradition being built up in the area. Thus, early exposure to 
education enabled the Mfengu to acquire 'Western' skills sooner than other Black nations, 
placing them in a favourable position to take advantage of job markets (both rural and urban) 
as they opened up. Indeed, many educated Mfengu were able to take up white collar 
employment in the emerging South African economy. These workers were consequently able 
to accumulate wealth and use this wealth to accumulate freehold land. 
Another group, like the Mfengu, that received tracts of freehold land during the nineteenth 
century in the Ciskei, and more specifically in the Keiskammahoek district, was a group of 
German descendants who had also assisted the British against the Xhosa in the frontier wars. 
By the time of the formation of the Union of South Africa (1910), there existed in the Ciskei 
both Black and White freehold agriculturalists who competed on a fairly equal footing in the 
regional agricultural produce markets. However, at this time, these freeholders were not the 
only inhabitants of the Ciskei. Various landless people had moved into the area, 
initially attaching themselves to land-owners as labour tenants performing 
certain services for their landlords, in return for the right to cultivate a portion 
of land; Many of these tenants later moved on to the commonage, in order 
to free themselves of their obligations to their landlords and hired land from, 
or share-cropped with the land-owners (De Wet, 1991: 2). 
Thus, the Ciskei was a region exhibiting a variety of land tenure forms. This diversity in 
land tenure forms still exists today, with each of the villages studied having its own unique 
land tenure history. 
47For a more detailed history see Manona (1981). 
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i) Upper Rabula 
Rabula, lying on the tarred road between Keiskammahoek town and Dimbaza (approximately 
a twelve minute drive from both), is one of the relatively few areas in the Ciskei where 
freehold land tenure is found. As well as freeholders, Rabula is home to landless people 
(squatting on the commonage and freehold land) and people that have access to trust land. 
A brief look at the history of Rabula shows that freehold land tenure goes back a long way. 
In Rabula, surveyed plots of freehold land had been sold to Blacks and a small collection of 
Whites (generally belonging to the group of German descendants mentioned above) since 
1866. At the same time, certain land (the 'commonage') was set aside as communal grazing 
land for all land-owners in the area (Mills and Wilson, 1952: 45). 
From this time to the turn of the century, many land-owners in Rabula bought additional land 
for their sons, often adjacent to their original freehold plots. This land was acquired under 
the quitrent land tenure system (Mills and Wilson, 1952: 47). Since the quitrent fee was 
abolished in 1934, this land can for all practical purposes be considered freehold land48• 
As De Wet (1991: 2) points out, since the initial acquisition of land in Rabula, landless 
people had moved into the area as labour tenants on freehold land. In many cases, these 
labour tenants subsequently moved on to the commonage. Over the years they were joined 
by descendants of land-owners for whom there was no freehold land available. 
This situation of Black and White freeholders, labour tenants and landless squatters on the 
commonage, has been modified over the years through a variety of institutional interventions. 
In 1936, the South African Native Trust49 (S.A.N.T.) began buying up the White-owned 
farms in Rabula. This trust land was used to grant landless families small portions of arable 
land, the landless families being settled on this land. Trust land was basically allocated 
through the village headman. The land remained the property of the S.A.N.T., thus title to 
trust land could not be transferred by sale. In many cases, however, this land could be passed 
from one generation to the next via inheritance (subject to the headman's approval). Portions 
of the trust land was allocated for grazing camps (De Wet, 1991: 2; and Mills and Wilson, 
1952: 46). 
Rabula was declared a 'Betterment Area' in 1939 (Mills and Wilson, 1952: 146), however, 
betterment planning was only implemented in Rabula in the late 1960's and early 1970's (De 
Wet, 1991: 3). Betterment only affected the trust areas and the landless people on the 
commonage. They were moved to specifically differentiated residential areas, the idea being 
to separate and fence off grazing land, arable land and residential land. Some families that 
had trust land lost it during the process of moving. 
48After extensive fieldwork in the area, De Wet (1991: 4) concludes that "for everyday purposes, people 
in Rabula do not distinguish between freeholders and quitrenters", indeed referring to both by the same term. 
49The S.A.N.T. was established in terms of the Native Trust and Land Act (1936), in order to buy up 
European-owned land in certain 'released' areas. 
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Today, in both Lower and Upper Rabula, one finds highly concentrated residential clusters 
housing both landless people and households with access to trust land. Amongst these 
clusters are pockets of freehold land with the land-owners having their residential sites on 
their own land. Some families are currently living as 'squatters' on freehold land, whilst 
some families have even started to move back on to the commonage5°. 
ii) Burnshill 
The village of Bumshill is situated in the south-west comer of the Keiskammahoek district 
on the dirt road running between Middledrift and Keiskammahoek town. It is approximately 
ten minutes drive from Middledrift and fifteen minutes drive from Keiskammahoek. Housing 
the headquarters of the Zanyokwe Irrigation Scheme, it lies about a kilometre from Fort Cox 
Agricultural College. Today, Bumshill, with a very strong mission school tradition, is 
somewhat of a 'schooling centre' within the district. 
Manona (1981: 11) states that after the expulsion of the Xhosa from their territory in the 
1850/53 frontier war, a group of Mfengu who had supported the colonial government in this 
war were granted 'reward land' in the area that today is Bumshill. They immediately came 
into contact with the United Free Church of Scotland and the Rev. James Laing who operated 
a mission at the site that today is Bumshill from 1830-1872. The Rev. Laing introduced the 
people of the area to Western education and improved cultivation methods. Indeed, 
missionaries served the area until 1931 (Manona, 1981: 11), being instrumental in initiating 
a strong educational ethic amongst the residents of Bumshill. 
In the first years of occupation of Bumshill, wealthier Mfengu families purchased additional 
freehold land in the area. However, in 1865 Bumshill was surveyed and between 1868 and 
1869, the land was formally granted to the residents of Bumshill as quitrent land51 (Mills 
and Wilson, 1952: 147). These quitrent sites formed a compact settlement in the area known 
as 'Old Bumshill', however, some people moved their homesteads onto the commonage to 
be near their fields (Manona, 1981: 12), where, over the years, they were joined by a certain 
amount of landless 'squatters'. 
Bumshill was proclaimed a 'Betterment Area' in 1939, becoming the first village in the 
district where the provisions of betterment planning were introduced (Mills and Wilson, 
1952: 149). The quitrent landholders were moved back to the sites in Old Bumshill, and the 
squatters were given permission to erect homesteads on the commonage immediately adjacent 
to the original block of quitrent sites. Today, more landless people have moved into the area 
and built houses on the commonage next to the quitrent sites. Indeed, children of the 
so All households, freehold and others, graze their stock on the commonage. Some trust areas have access 
to specifically allocated trust grazing camps. 
51Tbere exists a small pocket of freehold land behind Bumshill that did not fall under this registration. This 
isolated group of freeholders today falls under the administration of the Bumshill Residents' Association. 
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quitrent families have built their homesteads on the commonage, as title-holders are unable 
to subdivide quitrent land to pass it on to their heirs52• 
iii) Chatha 
The village of Chatha is situated in the northern most extremity of the Keiskammahoek 
district, against the mountains to the south of Cathcart. It is approximately a twenty minute 
drive from Keiskammahoek town along a dirt road that ends in Chatha, thus making the 
village notably more isolated than Rabula or Burnshill. Today, the only form of land tenure 
in Chatha is trust land tenure, and there exists a large number of households in the village 
that do not have arable land. 
In 1853 the Keiskammahoek district was established as a 'Royal Reserve'. This means that 
all land not individually held by quitrent or freehold land was regarded as 'Crown Land' 
(Mills and Wilson, 1952: 137). Chatha fell into this category, and as a 'Crown Native 
Location' had a communal land tenure. 
According to Government Notice No. 1029 of 1887, large areas of forested mountain slopes 
that had originally been part of Chatha's land were declared 'Crown Forests' (Mills and 
Wilson, 1952: 138), later becoming South African State forest, and ultimately, a Ciskei State 
Forest. 
Under the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936, Chatha's land was vested in the S.A.N.T., 
however, this resulted in no practical change in the land tenure form at the time. 
Chatha was proclaimed a 'Betterment Area' in 1939 (Mills and Wilson, 1952: 138), but it 
was not until 1964 that the betterment scheme was implemented. As in Rabula, people were 
moved to specifically demarcated residential clusters, separated and fenced off from the 
arable land and the grazing pastures (previously families had generally resided close to their 
arable land). In practice, the allocation of arable land was left in the hands of the headman 
who 'acted for' the local magistrate where the land allocation was registered53 • 
Today, Chatha has a lot of families that are landless. Given on-going population growth, 
there has for some time been insufficient arable land to allocate to 'young' households. 
Currently a situation is emerging where there is severe pressure on the demarcated residential 
land54 and newly married couples are being forced to live with their parents as new 
residential sites are scarce. 
S2Quitrent land traditionally devolves upon one male person in the household, determined by Tables of 
Succession (Mills and Wilson, 1952: 147). 
S3The fact that arable land is registered at the magistrate's office does not in practice give households any 
stronger title to the land. It still was not transferrable via sale or inheritance as it remained technically state-
owned land. 
S4 A significant portion of the residential land in Chatha has been damaged by severe erosion due to the fact 
that the betterment residential area lies below land that was previously used for grazing and cultivation. 
i) Maize. 
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All maize yields are given 'off the cob'. It must be noted that recorded maize yields under-
estimate true yields due to the fact that a certain proportion of maize tends to be eaten green. 
This proportion varies, depending on: 
(a) climatic conditions (which affect the crop); 
(b) general economic conditions (which affect the availability of substitutes for green 
maize); and 
(c) the proximity of the fields to the homestead (which influences the resource costs of 
eating green maize). 
In Rabula, it was possible to calculate three yields: 
freehold fields: 411 kg/ha; 
'other' fields55 : 228 kg/ha; and 
homestead gardens56: 237 kg/ha. 
This resulted in a weighted average yield57 for Rabula of 336 kg/ha which was used to 
estimate unrecorded maize crop yields. 
In Burnshill, an average yield figure of 480 kg/ha was observed on the irrigated plots. This 
was used to estimate the unrecorded yields in Burnshill. 
In Chatha the following average yields were observed: 
fields: 703 kg/ha; and 
homestead gardens: 833 kg/ha. 
These figures were used to estimate yields in the cases of unrecorded yields. 
An average maize price of 80c/kg was used to calculate the value of income-in-kind from 
maize cultivation. 
ii) Potatoes 
Average yield on dry land fields across the three villages was found to be 3215 kg/ha. This 
figure was used to approximate all unrecorded dry land crops. 
On irrigated plots in Burnshill, a considerably higher average yield of 13500 kg/ha was 
observed. There were no unrecorded yields on irrigated crops. 
55This category includes all fields other than freehold fields. 
56AI1 these homestead gardens were in households that were either 'landless' or had access to trust fields. 
No cases of freeholders planting mai:ze in their homestead gardens were found. 
57The weighting is according to area of land planted. 
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The average price for potatoes across the three villages, based on a volume of 2120 kg of 
potatoes traded, was 80c/kg. This was used in order to arrive at income-in-kind from the 
cultivation of potatoes. 
iii) Pumpkins 
An average yield of 497 heads/ha was observed for pumpkins planted between maize on dry 
land. This was used to estimate unrecorded yields. For pumpkins planted on their own, the 
average yield was 2486 heads/ha. There were no unrecorded yields for pumpkins grown 
under mono-culture. 
The average price for pumpkins traded, used to determine income-in-kind, was 93c/head. 
iv) Melons 
The average recorded yield of melons was 869 heads/ha on irrigated fields under mono-
culture and 286 heads/ha for dry land inter-cropping. These figures were used to estimate 
unrecorded yields. Income-in-kind from melon cultivation was calculated on the basis of an 
average price of Rl ,25/head. 
v) Beans 
Average bean yields were calculated to be 152 kg/ha for beans grown on dry land on their 
own, and 83 kg/ha for crops planted in dry land amongst the maize. · 
The average bean price, based on intra-community trading and local shop prices, was 
Rl,50/kg. 
vi) Spinach 
The only cases of spinach cultivation were in household gardens, where an average yield of 
4615 bunches/ha was recorded. The average price for spinach within the community was 
RI/bunch. 
vii) Onions 
Onions were only observed to be grown in homestead gardens, where an average yield of 
37500 heads/ha was recorded. The average price for onions within the community was 
30c/head. 
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The average values detailed below were used in the calculation of stock farming income. 
i) Cattle 
The average value of a mature head of cattle was R990S8• This was based on all recorded 
purchases and sales of cattle across the three villages during the survey year. The highest 
recorded price was R1500 and lowest was R700. Head of cattle that were not yet mature 
were valued at an average price of R49559• 
It proved impossible to realistically estimate income-in-kind from the production of milk. 
Such an estimation would require detailed knowledge of too many variables that could not 
be covered by the survey ( diet of the stock, age of cow, availability of water, standard of 
veterinary care, length of time since last pregnancy, etc.). This means that, in theory, the 
figure for income-in-kind from holding stock under-estimates the true value. However, in 
practice, due to the dry conditions in the survey year and the consequent poor condition of 
the cattle, this under-estimation would not seem to be serious. 
ii) Sheep 
Sheep were valued at an average price of R106 each based on records of sales within the 
community. Wool sales (all to the Ciskei co-operative) were recorded at the actual value of 
cash received (although in many cases such payments were 'voorskot' payments). 
iii) Goats 
Based on all recorded transactions involving goats, their average price within the community 
was seen to be RllO. 
58This concurs with the average homeland cattle price of R2,00 to R2,20 per kilogram calculated by Doctor 
C.J. Rose, retired senior researcher at A.R.D.R.I. (University of Fort Hare). 
59Tbis calculation is based on the following value weighting supplied by Doctor Rose: 
Animal Value Factor 
Mature head of cattle. 1 
Heifer/Tallie (older than 9 months). 0.6 - 0.8 
Calf (9 months or younger). 0.25 - 0.4 
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iv) Pigs 
The average price for mature pigs, based on all recorded transactions involving pigs and 
pork, was seen to be R275. However, as is to be expected, there was considerable variation 
about this mean. The value of a pig varied directly with its size which in tum, is dependent 
on its diet. Most pigs were fed on 'germ meal'. However, those that were brought up on 
'pig growth' feed grew considerably larger and often traded for significantly higher prices. 
Piglets were traded at R25 each. 
The most common transactions concerning pigs was the selling of a portion of the meat 
obtained when a pig was slaughtered. In such cases, when meat was sold for R275 or more, 
no household consumption was recorded. When a pig was slaughtered and meat was sold 
for less than R275, the difference between the amount obtained and R275 was taken to be 
household consumption of stock. 
v) Horses 
Horses were valued at R150 each. However, there were very few cases of households 
keeping horses6(). 
vi) Chickeris 
It proved impossible to accurately value household income-in-kind from chickens. However 
with the exception of one household in Chatha61 , chickens were only kept on a small scale 
for private usage. Egg production and numbers of chickens kept varied considerably across 
families and during the year. Significant numbers of chickens are continually lost to wild 
cats, jackals and birds of prey, further clouding possible estimates of income-in-kind from 
chickens. Thus, the recorded income-in-kind from stock farming would tend to slightly 
under-estimate the true picture. 
60In most instances, horses appeared to be kept and ridden as a form of status symbol. There was no 
evidence in the sample of horses being used commercially. 
61In one case in Chatha, the breeding of chickens was found to be a cash-generating activity and this income 
was recorded. However, in this case the household's keeping of chickens was on a vastly greater scale than 
any other household, in any of the three villages. 
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Report on Flint Sperber's "Rural Income. Welfare and Migration: A 
Study of Three Ciskeian Villages 
This is a very interesting thesis which has clearly involved a great 
deal of field work and interpretation of data. It contains a good 
analysis of inequality and labour migration. Sperber also includes 
several interpretive and speculative points (which could have been 
supplemented with more qualitative data - but are none the less 
useful). Sperber ties the sections on inequality and labour migration 
together in a very readable way. The implications for inequality and 
migration which he draws concerning future policies are fresh and 
original. 
Specific comments and queries are provided below: 
l Problems with structure 
1.1 The main problem with the thesis is that the analytical focus has 
been spread a little too widely. This is part of the reason for the 
weakness in the structure. 
1.2 In the introduction, Sperber gives the impression that the thesis,. 
is about testing models of migration - yet migration is only really 
discussed in the final chapter. The emphasis in the introduction is 
c;kewed and the comments about measuring inequality seem to be rather 
tacked on. Furthermore, why are the comments about land tenure placed 
in the introduction? 
1.3 Some re-organisation would have been useful - for example, the 
information contained in Appendix C should perhaps have been included 
in chapter one. Knowing a bit more about the villages would have made 
it easier to follow the points made in the chapter. As it stands, the 
reader has to piece the story together him or herself. 
2 References to the literature 
2.1 The thesis is a little short on references to the literature. 
Sperber should have drawn more on existing rural studies or provided 
more detail about the previous work on Ciskei in order to 
·, 
2 
contextualise the study and situate his work in appropriate academic 
traditions. 
2.2 Sperber makes unsubstantiated claims in certai,n places - and 
should have provided references. For example, he talks about the 
'prediction so radical writers' (p.64) without providing any. 
supporting references. On the same page, he talks about what 
conventional urban transition models predict for South Africa -
without providing adequate references here either. 
2.3 When discussing unemployment (p.17) Spe~ber should have included 
more about the problems of measuring work, labour force participation 
etc. A reference at least to the work .of Moll (1984) would have been 
useful. 
3 Statistical Issues 
3.1 There are some statisti9al problems with the work. Sperber breaks 
his sample down into rather small sizes (eg Rabula Freehold= 17, 
Other= 21) This raises the problem of statistical significance of 
his results - something which he never comments on (eg p.9). This is 
rather worrying. 
3.2 On p.10, Sperber claims that a notable change in household size / 
had occurred - yet the ay.erage had moved from 6.25 to 6.68 over the 
period in question. This is not a significant change. If Sperber 
meant to say that there had been a notable change in composition of 
the household - then he should have made this clear. Also, his ratios 
in table 4 are not notably different from the Ciskeian average. (as he 
implies) . 
3.3 His use of two decimal places is unnecessary and inappropriate. 
3.4 His analysis of educational differences is interesting - except 
for table 3 where the percentages do not add up. (If they are not 
supposed to, then I cannot understand the table). His analysis of the 
relationship between education and migration, in chapter 3, is, 
however, very good. 
3.5 On page 25 Sperber points out the differences in measuring income 
between his and the 1949 study (see footnote 18). Yet he goes on to 




are so great that he should rather have attempted to make .certain 
adjustments to the data to ensure compatibility before presenting the 
data as he does in table 9. 
3.6 When reading chapters 2 and 3 it occurred to me that Sperber 
should have commented on the role of age. Were the age profiles of 
the villages different? If there were more old people in Chatha it 
might explain the relative dependence on pensions for example. 
3.7 Page 40: What does Sperber mean when he says that different HELs 
were calculated for each family member? On what basis? He should 
explain his methodology more thoroughly. The reader should not be 
required to simply accept his data at face value. 
4 Household Income 
4.1 The section on measuring household income is very good. Sperber 
could, however, have made more use of his data. The section on income 
from stock is interesting and good (although comparisons with other 
studies on rates of return from cattle would have been useful) - .as 
are his sections on pensions and on crop income. (By the way, is the 
observation on p.29 about unreliable ploughing services a surmise -
or gleaned from interviews?) 
4.2 On p.21 Sperber talks,.about migrants paying the accounts by stop 
order for certain househc,id goods consumed in rural areas. He claims 
that this 'clearly reduces transaction costs, thereby increasing the 
efficiency of remittances'. This is a good point. But does the 
efficiency angle perhaps also depend on what the household members 
would have chosen to do with the cash - and on the rate of interest 
charged? 
4.3 Also, did Sperber explore the difference between certain house-
hold's reported accounts payments and what is actually paid? Was he 
not asking the wrong party about the value of account payments? 
5 Distribution of Income and Village Welfare Levels 
5.1 The analysis of the distribution of income and village welfare 
levels is good. The analysis appears sound - although I must admit, 




5.2 The notion that the data supports the inverted U shaped 
hypothesis (p.57) seems rather far-fetched. 
6 Migration 
6.1 The notion that being unemployed in a rural area is better than 
being unemployed. in an urban area seems to avoid the question of the 
costs of job search (and hence the kinds of arguments put foreword by 
Todaro as to why rural-urban migration takes place in the face of 
high levels of urb�n un�mployment). 
6.2 On p.67 The use of the ideas about risk spreading from Guillet's 
Peru study is ev,ocative - yet Sperber should have explored it more -
perhaps using qualitative material or references to other studies. 
6.3 On p.72, Sperber says that the household can·say what is remitted 
but cannot say much about the salary of the migrant. Yet, judging 
from the questionnaire, he attempted to ask about salaries. What was 
the result? 
6.4 This leads me to a few comments about methodology. It would have 
been useful to have had more about his research experience. An 
explanation as to why he did not analyse all the questions he asked 
would have been useful. 
As noted above, the thesis has several flaws. However, considering 
that this is an original piece of field work, and considering that it 
has been submitted as one part of a requirement for a Master's 
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External Examiner's Report on 
"Rural income, welfare and migration 
by Flint S.Sperber. 
a study of 3 Ciskeian villages" 
The candidate has used data collected in the "1990 Keiskammahoek Rural Survey" 
{Rhodes University) to study rural income, welfare aud migration in 3 villages, 
in an attempt to assess the likelihood of continued circular migration and to 
suggest guidelines for regional policy in a new national political dispensation. 
An interesting conclusion of the study is that it supports the views of Bell (1972) 
and Mabin (1990) that circular (temporary) migration.is likely to persist in the 
South African labour market; this contradicts the common expectation of unavoidable 
urbanisation (with its questionable welfare effects). 
The candidate starts off with a clear .description of the demographic profile and 
a brief history of land tenure in the research area. In chapter 3, he carefully 
defines the various components of household income; a rearrangement of the para­
graphs might have improved the readability of this section. Chapter 4 is devoted 
to an assessment of poverty and to an analysis of income distribution following 
Stark et al. (1986). Using a decomposition of the Gini index and a simple welfare 
function, the.candidate shows that an increase in "source j income" will have 
a positive mean income effect and a positive or negative distribution effect, the 
net effect on welfare being positive. It seems therefore inappropriate to qualify 
a change in income distribution as 11worse" or "improved", as this refers to welfare 
effects : the distribution itself can only become more or less equal. Also, non­
remittance income is said to be ltan extremely small and insignificant portion of 
total income" (p.54, note 3.5), while on p.62 it is given as "a large component of 
total village income". Chapter 5 deals with on-going temporary {oscillating) 
migration and contains various, cautiously worded, policy suggestions as regards 
regional upliftment. When considering how the rural family tries to cope with risk, 
the candidate omitted any reference to the stockvel arrangements which appear to 
be effective in various areas. The concluding bibliographic section is pertinent 
and exhaustive. 
This is a superb thesis : its subject is well researched, the concepts used are 
clearly defined with the necessary caveats, and the attention to a.'ii.alytical detail 
is sustained throughout. Above all, the candidate has mamged to arrange his data 
in such a way that they were appropriate for the application of mathematical tech­
niques. I am convinced that (part of) the thesis is suitable for publication in 
a journal of Development.Economics and gladly propose a mark of 90%. As supervisor, 
Ms Hartzenberg surely must be con,gratulated for having "aided immeasurably in the 
generation of this thesis". 
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